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ABSTRACT
The war in the Balkans suggests that despite the end of the East-West conflict,
general instability casts a pall of doubt over hopes of enduring peace in Europe and
beyond. As one sees in South East Europe, post-communism creates nationalism which
can lead to war. The former Yugoslavia is the test case. In East Central Europe, where
former Soviet satellites are facing a similar power vacuum and Russian imperialism
celebrates its possible rebirth, war could be the consequence if NATO is not able and
willing to provide security and stability in this region. This thesis investigates the factors
which define the current crisis in NATO and transatlantic security relations. This in turn
brings up the question of structural realities in German-American strategic interaction.
This thesis examines how lasting internal conflicts gain new explosive force today and
presents conclusions regarding the survival of NATO. In the end, the thesis suggests that
NATO and the tantamount security partnership with the United States is vitally
significant for Germany and for stability in Europe. This maxim applies to the past and it
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The future challenges for transatlantic partnership will take place outside old
NATO boundaries. Former clearly defined limits of regional and global perspectives, as
well as the limits of the Alliance, thus become ambiguous. For the United States this
means that in the future it is likely to become involved in a regional crisis. For united
Germany it means that the Germans can no longer think only in terms of security
guarantees for its NATO allies. Thus the most difficult future structural problem in
German-American security relations will revolve around the share of responsibility for
collective security outside its own regional interests that Germany will be willing to
accept. The share of responsibility that Germany will be able to cope with will determine
whether German-American security relations have a positive future.
The latest challenges for the United States and united Germany within the
framework of NATO and UN have also demonstrated that the structural realities in their
security relations have gained more explosive force, because there is no longer a common
threat. Deterrence in the nuclear age was in American hands. The new deterrence will
not be controlled by the United States alone. Clear goals and a solid political will stood
behind the old deterrence. There will not be a new deterrence as long as there is an
absence of such clear goals and a solid political will.
IX
The war in former Yugoslavia and the Persian Gulf War indicate in their own
respective ways that the United States must continue to provide world leadership. The
Gulf War showed an example of a strong American leadership role from which the
Europeans could benefit for their own security purposes. The present crisis in the
Balkans demonstrates that Europe will continue to rely on security and political ties with
the United States, despite efforts to create common foreign and security policies within
the European Union.
The case studies also suggest that since the end of the Cold War, European crises
do not appear to involve United States' interests. However, a world power cannot long
neglect crises in the international community. The absense of American leadership in
former Yugoslavia may cause problems in the years to come because the example
Vladimir V. Zhirinovsky or others like him take from Bosnia is that the Americans will
act more with rhetoric than with force unless their direct security interests are concerned.
The Europe of the future will need the leadership of the sole remaining world
power: the United States of America. Without the leadership of an overseas and
non-partisan power, NATO would lose its ability to act, because the West European
partners' national interests would get in the way. Europe would then lose the only
functioning security system capable of filling the existing power vacuum in East Central
Europe. Given recent events in Russia, the absence of the United States and NATO
would again make Europe vulnerable to political developments that might result in a
"Second Cold War."
The future of NATO will especially depend on the future of German-American
relations. The United States needs a dependable European "partner in leadership" who
will play an active role in European unity and at the same time serve as a bridge to
Eastern Europe. Germany is the only country that can do this. Germany, on the other
hand, needs America not only because Germany as a non-nuclear power is dependent on
US nuclear security guarantees, but because only through this German-American
partnership can the fears of the political and economic power of a unified Germany,




A. NATURE OF THE PROBLEM
The war in the Balkans suggests that despite the end of the East-West conflict,
general instability casts a pall of doubt over hopes of enduring peace in Europe and
beyond. NATO may have won the Cold War against the Warsaw Pact, but the possibility
of a wider war in South East Europe challenges the alliance daily. If wars of aggression
return to Europe while the leaders of NATO look the other way, then such chaos will not
only undermine a new security structure for Europe, but also global insecurity and
instability will be the consequences.
The war in the Balkans is the result of a power vacuum in Europe which emerged
after the end of the Cold War. As one see in South East Europe, post-communism creates
nationalism, which can lead to war. The former Yugoslavia is the test case. In East
Central Europe, where former Soviet satellites face a similar power vacuum and the
possible rebirth of Russian imperialism, war could be the consequence if NATO is not
able or willing to provide security and stability in this region.
For united Germany, the key to security has always been the NATO alliance and
partnership with the United States. Nonetheless, the successful history of NATO and
German-American security relations is also marked by repeated phases of internal crises
and conflicts. Such conflicts create the strategic reality. As the example in the Balkans
dramatically shows, the final test of a security alliance is war.
This thesis investigates the factors that define the current crisis in transatlantic
security relations. This analysis in turn brings up the question of structural realities in
German-American strategic interaction. This thesis examines how lasting internal
conflicts gain new immediacy today and it presents conclusions regarding the survival of
NATO. Finally, the thesis suggests that NATO and the paramount security partnership
with the United States is vitally significant for Germany and for stability in Europe. This
is the maxim illustrated by the past, and it holds equally true for the future.
NATO must restore deterrence to thwart the use of force. The aggressors of
tomorrow must realize that they have no chance of reaching their goals with violence.
This reality requires might and decisiveness in NATO actions. This is made more
difficult by the fact that, after expending tremendous energy during previous periods of
confrontation, Europe and the Western World have directed their energies to internal
affairs. People forget that esprit de corps, solidarity, and the readiness to shed blood
when necessary have been the historical foundations of peace in Europe.
B. SUBJECT DEFINITION
Political scientists and historians have intensively researched the creation of
security alliances, as well as issues involved in dealing with external foes and cohesion
among allies. 1 They have proven that the state of an alliance can be analyzed less by
See for example, Beer, F.A. (ed.) Alliances: Latent War Communities in the Contemporary
commonness and much more by inherent problem areas and resulting correlations that
most clearly characterize crisis situations.
In examining German-American security relations in the framework of NATO, five




The issues of domestic politics
The dilemma between European integration and transatlantic partnership
The factor of burden-sharing
Figure 1 illustrates these problem areas, along with their political and military
derivations. These problem areas make up the structural realities in German-American
security relations. Their effects on these relations up until the end of the Cold War will
be examined in Chapter II of this thesis.
The illustration in Figure 1 clearly suggests that the structural realities involved in
the transatlantic relationship mandate an unequal partnership. America has benefited
from a unique geostrategic island-like position that has afforded the superpower 200
years of military impregnability. Thus, two mutually influential fundamental orientations
have proven true: the isolationism which lies dormant in the American psyche and
globalism, which is the result of the global orientation of a Western superpower. The
World (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1970).
domestic political battle of these two deeply-rooted trends determines the kind and extent













































Figure 1. Structural Realities in German-American Security Relations
Unlike the US which is protected by oceans, the continent of Europe lies as an
appendix on the western periphery of the greater Eurasian land mass. During the Cold
War, the superior conventional potential of the Warsaw Pact posed a direct threat to
Europe. Europe was also confronted with the Eurostrategic nuclear threat of the former
Soviet Union.
Invulnerable to direct conventional attacks against their own country, America
considered its greatest risk to be that conventional disparities in Europe would push the
US into nuclear confrontation with the former Soviet Union. In the case of conflict, this
would have meant risking America's existence for the sake of protecting Europe.
Because of this perception, the Americans were on the one hand interested in minimizing
their own risk through nuclear deterrence and arms control measures, something of which
the West Europeans were always suspicious. On the other hand, America, in exercising
its leadership, insisted that the alliance partners in Europe who were responsible for
conventional defense take on a greater defense role.
The goal of being relieved of world power status became an inherent source of
conflict resulting from latent American isolationism after the US had entered the
"entangling alliance" with Western Europe at the beginning of the Cold War. The source
of conflict was further intensified by (what the Americans considered) the Europeans'
unwillingness to do more for their own defense. American disappointment over this
European attitude toward burden-sharing has characterized transatlantic security relations
since the 1950's.
The burden-sharing conflict and concern about American willingness to genuinely
share the risks when talking about nuclear guarantees for Europe caused the Europeans to
further unite. This is especially true in the case of two former arch enemies, Germany
and France. Besides seeking a solid partnership with the US, Germany was also seeking
reconciliation with France. This relationship with its neighbor on the other side of the
Rhine developed into a constant dilemma for Germany. The cause of this dilemma was
the French demand since 1958 that it preserve its unrestricted national independence.
The French figured that this demand would rule out military integration of their troops
into the alliance, thus giving rise to a conflict with the United States. From then on the
United States followed the German-French dialog with great interest. The United States
was concerned that the Federal Republic might also turn its back on NATO.
The Federal Republic was especially at risk because of its boundary position
between two different political systems and its geopolitically key position in Central
Europe. The most important principle of German security became mulitnationality, with
eight partners already enjoying peace in the NATO alliance. A singularization of the
Federal Republic was to be avoided at all costs. Because West Germany could not
change its geostrategic position in Europe on its own, it wanted to at least mitigate
negative consequences of its exposed position. Germany wanted the most tension-free
relationship between East and West because any tension between NATO and the Warsaw
Pact would put pressure on the sensitive relations between the two Germanies.
Dismantling sources of conflict and creating a trust-building environment thus became
the driving force for West German Ostpolitik.
Another structural problem came in the form of the correlation of security policy
developments in and out of NATO territory. This is how the question of the alliance's
limits came up. One can see that today's out of area discussion is not a new problem,
particularly in Germany. Since the Korean War, this topic has led to tensions because the
United States, following a maritime strategy, incorporated the political and strategic
developments of the entire world in its foreign and security policies. Meanwhile, the
Europeans concentrated on more of a regional approach, which essentially led to
conflicts.
With the end of the Cold War and collapse of former totalitarian regimes, the
political situation and threats to peace in Europe have changed considerably. After the
breakup of the Soviet Union, the world learned that violently suppressed ethnic tensions
are still highly dangerous; the outbreak of several regional armed conflicts in
Southeastern Europe demonstrate this. Chapter III will examine three case studies that
demonstrate how German-American security relations have further developed under the
conditions of the post-Cold War era. These case studies will demonstrate that the
structural realities in this relationship still remain valid, although they have another
valence. This also applies to German-American strategic interactions under UN auspices.
Chapter IV deals with the future of NATO and the future of Europe. The chapter
will suggest that a successful future for the transatlantic partnership (which must include
the newly independent states in East Central Europe) will be guaranteed only if the
structural realities in all important areas, especially in the area of burden-sharing, comply
with the framework of new security policy. Reunited Germany has a key role to play in
the formation and execution of such policy. The thesis will end with Chapter V, which
offers suggestions on what such compliance should entail.
II. FROM POTSDAM TO MAINZ (1945-1989): THE STRUCTURAL FOUNDA-
TIONS OF GERMAN-AMERICAN SECURITY RELATIONS
With the End of the East-West confrontation, the United States and Germany find
themselves at a crossroads. There has been a general impression in Europe that the
United States has lost interest in West European security affairs. By the same token,
there is a sense on the other side of the Atlantic that the Europeans have lost interest in
their own security. This problem is as old as NATO and the German-American security
partnership. Today, many Americans are concerned about a developing rift which they
see between once close allies, Germany and the United States. They also fear the
possibility that this rift could lead to a change in global politics, especially in a world of
uncertainty and chance after the end of the Communist threat. 2
In order to understand the current crisis in transatlantic security relations, one has to
examine the history of NATO and German-American strategic interaction. This chapter
will therefore investigate the structural realities of this relationship from the Potsdam
Conference in 1945 through the unification of Germany in 1990.
Post-World War II development of German-American security relations may be
divided into two stages which, one could argue, accurately represent the psychological
development of Germany's international role. These stages are associated with two
places in Germany: Potsdam (1945) and Mainz (1989). Physically and materially
See for example, Smyser, W.R., Germany and America: New Identities, Fateful Rift?
(Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press: 1993).
decimated, Germany unconditionally surrenders in August 1945 and is divided into
occupied zones. In July 1945, in the Potsdam castle of Cecilienhof, representatives of the
victorious nations meet: Harry S. Truman, Josef W. Stalin, Clement Attlee, and, later,
Winston Churchill. A declaration sums up their talks; a declaration that is to do away
with German militarism and Nazism once and for all. The allies came up with
agreements to insure that Germany would never again be able to threaten its neighbors or
world peace ,3
Germany had no military for the following ten years. Many people, including true
conservatives, swore that Germans would never to touch weapons again. But it did not
take long for Germany to begin rearming itself. The United States was especially active
in demanding that Germany rearm itself because of the East-West confrontation, which
was beginning to manifest itself as early as 1946/47. The fall of both communism and
the Berlin Wall completed a cycle of German-American security relations which had
been decidedly dictated by the Cold War. A new chapter in security relations was
reached when in Mainz, Germany, George Bush declared on May 31, 1989:
The United States and the Federal Republic have always been firm friends
and allies; but today we share an added role: partners in leadership. Of course
leadership has a constant companion: responsibility. And our responsibility is to
look ahead and grasp the promise of the future. 4
See Nogee, J.L., and Donaldson, R.H., Sow'ef Foreign Policy since World War II, 4th ed.
(New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1 992), p. 81
.
Europa-Archiv, 12/1989, pp. D536 ff.
It is a fact that Germany owes tremendous thanks to the United States for its
unmistakable, guiding support in attaining reunification. However, the long road from
Potsdam to Mainz was also a road pockmarked with German-American crises. These
crises illuminate the character of German-American security relations, a subject which is
poorly understood in the United States.
A. FROM THE BEGINNING OF THE COLD WAR TO THE KOREAN WAR
(1944/46-1950)
1. The United States Remains a European Power
The founding of NATO in April 1 949 resulted from the Soviet Union posing a
threat to Western Europe. Though deterring a Soviet attack was NATO's principal
interest, it was not its only concern. As Lord Ismay, NATO's first general secretary put
it, the alliance had three goals: "To keep the Soviets out, the Americans in and the
Germans down. 5 "
Just as everyone agreed on plans in Yalta in 1 945 to keep Germany down after
the war, it was also clear that in talks between Roosevelt and Stalin, the last thing on
America's mind was a future military presence and military alliance in Europe. Rather,
the United States wanted to have all American troops out of Europe within two years of
the war's end. 6 In the United States at that time, public pressure was mounting for rapid
Quoted in Feldmeyer, K., "Die NATO und Deutschland nach dem Ende des
Ost-West-Gegensatzes," in Zitelmann, R., Weissmann, K., and Grossheim, M. (eds.), Westbindung
(Frankfurt/M.: Propylaen, 1993), p. 460.
See Joffe, J., "Nach der Revolution: Die amerikanischen Interessen in Europa in den
10
demobilization. Everything indicated that for the second time in this century, an
American withdrawal from Europe would leave behind a power vacuum that would, in
turn, result in instability and insecurity in the face of looming Soviet expansion. 7
At the time, United States' military doctrine specified that extensive
conventional forces would not be necessary to protect American interests; rather, the US
could depend on military bases in both the Atlantic and Pacific theaters. Herein lies the
initial crisis of the Atlantic partnership with the United States: ever-important sea and air
dominance in the leading western power's strategic thinking and the strong belief at that
time in the power of deterrence by America's nuclear monopoly. 8
With solid trust in the atom bomb's power of deterrence, Washington was set to
redeploy American troops from overseas to America after Japan was defeated. The
United States military, which during the war had grown to 12 million soldiers, was
reduced to 1.6 million. The US forces in Germany were reduced just as drastically: from
2.6 million to 103,749 soldiers. 9
The outbreak of the East-West conflict in 1947, especially the events in Greece
and Turkey,' changed the United States' foreign affairs plans. The Western powers had
neunziger Jahren," in Mahnke, K. (ed.), Amerikaner in Deutschland-Grundlagen unci Bedingungen
der transatlantischen Sicherheit (Bonn: Bouvier 1991), p. 182.
See Nelson, K.L, Victors Divided-America and the Allies in Germany, 1918-1923
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975), pp. 243-253.
See Sherry, M.S., Preparing for the Next War-American Plans for Postwar Defense, 1941-45
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977), p. 218.
See Haftendorn, H., "Historische Entwicklung, politische Motive und rechtliche
Crundlagen," in Mahnke, 1991, p. 140.
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agreed on a policy based on limiting Soviet power and influence and involving the United
States on the international military scene. The Soviets' incredible superiority in the area
of conventional warfare was a particular threat to Europe, where the Western powers did
not have a functioning alliance at the time able to successfully resist attack.
For the first time in United States history, the US wanted to continue its military
presence in Europe in order to contain Soviet expansion, rather than follow through with
the planned withdrawal from Europe at the end of World War II. This meant a change of
direction in American policy, even if only half-heartedly implemented.
National leaders had always hoped that America's skeletal navy, coastal
fortifications, and latent strength would discourage an attack on the homeland. But
the nation's feeling of security before World War II arose primarily from its sense
of geographical remoteness from the cockpits of conflict, not from confidence in its
modest professional military forces. The nation usually built a large war machine
only after hostilities began, and then in order to punish aggression or pursue other
national goals rather than to deter an attack."
The United States had already fought Germany on the European continent once
in this century, but following World War I, American troops only remained five years as
part of the Allied occupation forces in the German Rhineland. The decision to be a part
of this occupation force was justified (the presence of American troops served as a
stabilizing device, appeasing the Germans and restraining the French), but the withdrawal
of the last American troops in January 1923 was difficult to accept. The French invasion
of the Ruhr and increasingly tense Franco-German relations in that year are directly
,n See Nogee, J.L., and Donaldson, R.H., 1992, pp. 92-93.
11 Sherry, M.S., 1977, p. 201.
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correlated to American withdrawal policy in the early 1920's. 12 The Americans had
already rejected the Treaty of Versailles, which they felt had too great an influence on
Germany.
After the American Senate had rejected the Versailles Treaty, the United
States government maintained a position of decided aloofness from European
disputes. In the separate peace treaty that was concluded between Germany and
America in August 1921, Washington disclaimed all responsibility for the political
and military provisions of the Versailles peace settlement and their execution. It
was understandable that the US government remained in the background when, in
1923, tensions in Germany reached a new high and led to the French occupation of
the Ruhr. America's only reaction was to withdraw the last American troops of
occupation that had remained in the Rhineland. Secretary of State Charles Evans
Hughes thought that a 'bit of chaos' would not hurt the Europeans but might bring
them to their senses. 13
Once again Europe was on its own. The United States left the Europeans to take
care of their own business until 1941. But a "bit of chaos" eventually was enough to
convert Europe into a region of insecurity and instability, which finally led to war. The
Americans had wanted to withdraw from Europe because most European countries did
not seem to be morally-suitable allies. There was no way even the Americans could
know that this Europe, left to its own devices, would turn out to be an uncontrollable
disaster for the next three decades.
Churchill's speech in Fulton in March of 1946 and American Secretary of State
James Byrnes' speech in Stuttgart in September 1946 were cornerstones of a development
See Nelson, K.L., Victors Divided-America and the Allies in Germany, 1918-1923
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975), pp. 243-253.
Schwabe, K., "The United States and the Weimar Republic: A ' Special Relationship' that
Failed," in Trommler F., and McVeigh, J. (eds.), America and the Cermans-An Assessment of a
Three-Hundred-Year History (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania, 1985), p. 21.
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toward a continental US presence in Europe, influenced by the anti-Hitler coalition's
downfall and the developing Cold War. 14 The final turn toward permanence in Europe
occurred in the summer of 1948, when the three Western allies decided on a divided
Federal Republic of Germany and then reacted to a Soviet blockade of West Berlin with
an airlift.
Even if the United States strongly considered it its duty to contain an
increasingly aggressive, expansive-minded and powerful Soviet Union, 15 the US still
wanted to eventually withdraw from Europe for the long term. In order to avoid leaving a
power vacuum, and to keep Germany from losing ties to the West, the British initiative
toward the Brussels Treaty 16 was finally supported by the US in 1948. A year later, in
April 1949, the United States and its European allies signed the North Atlantic Treaty.
With its military contribution for a common defense plan of NATO in Europe,
the US followed the principles of an unchanged dominating maritime (air) strategy: the
US was determined to supply its strategic air force and navy, Great Britain and France
were to be responsible for a tactical air force and, finally, continental Europe would be
See Borgert, H.-L, "Zur Entstehung, Entwicklung und Struktur der Dienstgruppen in der
britischen und amerikanischen Besatzungszone Westdeutschlands 1945-1950," in Militargeschichte
seit 1945: Dienstgruppen und westdeutscher Verteidigungsbeitrag, Voruberlegungen zur
Bewaffnung der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, ed. by Militargeschichtliches Forschungsamt,
Boppard am Rhein, 1982, pp. 106-109.
See Wiggershaus, N., "Nordatlantische Bedrohungsperzeptionen im Kalten Krieg
1948-1956," in Maier, K.A. and Wiggershaus, N. (eds.), Das Nordatlantische Bundnis 1948-1956,
Munich, 1993, pp. 18-21.
See Kaplan, L.S., "Die Westunion und die militarische Integration Europas 1948-1950. Eine
Darstellung aus amerikanischer Sicht," in Wiggerhaus, N. and Foerster, R.G. (eds.), Die westliche
Sicherheitsgemeinschaft 1948-1950, Cemeinsame Probleme und gegesatzliche Nationalinteressen
in der Grundungsphase der Nordatlantische Allianz, Boppard am Rhein, 1 988, pp. 37-56.
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responsible for conventional land forces. Deploying US land forces within the
framework of a continental strategy was not intended; the approximately 82,500
American soldiers still in Europe in 1949 were in Germany and Austria exclusively for
administrative military purposes. 17
Defense planning followed the strategic wishes of the United States and — to a
lesser extent — those of the United Kingdom in this early stage of NATO. In light of the
increasing severity of world circumstances and the beginning Berlin crisis, the US came
up with its war plan Halfmoon in the spring of 1948. This plan corresponded with
American strategic thinking in that in the event of Soviet attack, Western Europe would
respond with a massive atomic, strategic air war against the Soviet Union. After
short-term resistance on the Rhine, American occupation forces in Europe were to be
delivered into safety by way of French and Italian seaports. In the spring of 1949, with
the US now a member of NATO, the strategy was changed so as to be able to defend the
river Rhine as early as possible. The goal was now to be ready to deploy American
occupation forces to offset a Soviet attack and not, as was originally planned, to withdraw
them without fighting. However, because of the scarcely available air power within the
framework of the Offtackle planning, one saw in the United States a realistic means of
defense for Southern Europe and Great Britain. Winning back continental Europe was
thought to be feasible within two years of the start of hostilities. 18
See Haftendorn, 1991, p.144.
See Greiner, C, "Militarstrategische Konzeptionen fur die Verteidigung Westeuropas 1948
bis 1950," in Wiggershaus, N. and Foerster, R.G.(eds.), Die westliche Sicherheitsgemeinschaft
1948-1950. Gemeinsame Probleme und gegensatzliche Nationalinteressen in der Grundungsphase
15
Global demands and budget constraints continued to influence United States'
military strategy for NATO. From the worldwide possibility of war with the Soviet
Union and the only effective means of defense a Strategic Air Command (SAC) armed
with atom bombs emerged the concept of total war to contrast with limited war. This was
a concept that was to ensure the Soviet Union's defeat. According to this plan, Europe
and the continental mainland were of mere regional importance. Only the European
strategic bomber bases and bases on Azores, Greenland and Iceland were of military
importance. All these bases represented a peripheral or indirect defense for the
continental mainland. The Americans felt that directly and conventionally defending
Europe with a continental strategy was not a main priority; or, it was simply something
the Europeans had to worry about themselves.
After the Soviets tested their first atom bombs in August of 1 949, the American
strategy of nuclear deterrence and its defense plans for Europe were questioned. The
success of Soviet nuclear technology represented a nuclear threat alongside the
conventional; furthermore, the Soviets were in the process of significantly expanding
their long-range bomber fleets. Instead of concentrating more on its conventional
strategies, Washington reacted by intensifying its own nuclear program and building
hydrogen bombs. 19 This decision represented a continuation of previous strategic
ideology. The continental European allies deeply mistrusted this development. They
der Nordatlantischen Allianz, Boppard am Rhein 1988, pp. 262-264.
See Wiggershaus, N., "Nordatlantische Bedrohungsperzeptionen im Kalten Krieg
1948-1956," pp. 25-30.
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were more interested in America's land forces defending their land and less interested in
atom bombs which could destroy Western Europe.
The United States did not entirely forget about NATO's weakness in
conventional strategy, however. In the face of an increasing global threat in the form of
the Soviet Union and the founding of the People's Republic of China on October 1, 1949,
the containment policy (outlined in NSC-20) underwent major revising. 20
The ensuing document, NSC68, recommended a major expansion of both
general-war and limited-war capabilities and the strengthening of America's allies;
a special point was made of allied weakness in Europe. The report estimated that
the danger of a major Soviet attack could become acute by 1954, when it was
expected that the Soviets would have built up a sizable strategic nuclear force. 21
The NSC-68 analysis dictated that the West depart from pure atomic deterrence
in favor of a conventional strategy. 22 The mandatory inclusion of Western Europe in the
more narrow security plans of the United States had to include the Federal Republic of
Germany. The rearmament of West Germany was now only a matter of time.
2. West German Defense Perspectives Between 1948 and 1950
Germany occupied the front line position throughout the Cold War. Had the
Soviet Union chosen to risk armed conflict in Europe, Germany would have been the first
country to be overrun, and this is perhaps the first geopolitical reality that the Germans
Graebner, N.A. (ed.), The National Security. Its Theory and Practice, 1945-1960 (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1986), p. 23.
Richardson, J.L., Germany and the Atlantic Alliance-The Interaction of Strategy and Politics
(Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1966), pp. 18-19.
See Freedman, L, The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1989),
pp. 69-71.
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confronted. The founding of NATO indirectly increased the Federal Republic's security
because the West showed that it was prepared to unite in common defense; furthermore,
the United States was tying itself more and more to Europe's destiny. Although the
alliance's commitment for support did not include West Germany's territory, it did
include the Western occupation troops. In Bonn, the fact that Germany was being
disarmed caused grave concern about future security for several reasons: the occupying
powers' refusal to commit to support, uncertainty concerning how long the allies would
be in Germany, the Berlin blockade that developed in June 1948, armament in the Soviet
zone and the knowledge of allied defense plans.23
According to NATO's defense plans, West Germany east of the river Rhine was
considered to be no man's land. This fact made Konrad Adenauer realize that the mere
existence of NATO would not be enough ensure the protection for which Germany
hoped. 24 Germany would have to first become a member of the alliance. Konrad
Adenauer's observation 45 years ago is as true today as it ever was for European security.
Today, one may consider the area east of the rivers Oder and Neisse to be no man's land.
Later, this point will be further explored.
From 1949 on, Adenauer wanted West Germany to become a full member in
NATO and be responsible for its share of alliance duties. In return, he wanted the Federal
See Wiggerhaus, N., "Zur Frage der Planung fur die verdeckte Aufstellung westdeutscher
Verteidigungskrafte in Konrad Adenauers sicherheitspolitischer Konzeption 1950," in
Militargeschichte seit 1945: Dienstgruppen und westdeutscher Verteidigungsbeitrag, pp. 1 5-1 6.
Adenauer, K., Konrad Adenauer - Erinnerungen 1955-1959 (Stuttgart: Deutsche
Verlags-Anstalt, 1967), p. 1 5 ff
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Republic to receive equal status as the other members. West Germany wanted to be
defended as far to the east as possible, a view that clearly conflicted with America's
offtackle plan still in effect at that time. The river Elbe was to be considered the front
line. The first goal was to stop a Russian land attack. The West Germans wanted any
battle between the Elbe and the river Rhine to be fought with 55 divisions; 12 would be
West German divisions. 25 Thus, while the United States was interested in the operative
components of the air force and atom bomb in an indirect approach, the Federal Republic
tended to value direct defense by conventional means. 26
The outbreak of the Korean War in June of 1950 caused the United States to
drastically alter its policy toward Europe. The surprise attack on South Korea served as a
indicator to the world, especially Western Europe, of future Soviet policy. Meanwhile,
Western Europe was starting to have more and more doubts about the effectiveness of
American nuclear deterrence. The Western Europeans seriously questioned America's
strategy of balancing out the Red Army's superiority through nuclear deterrence. On the
other side of the Atlantic, America was ready to take energetic measures with allies to
improve the West's defense capabilities. 27 However, sharp increase in the Europeans'
defense contributions did not occur because of the Europeans' weak economic power;
See Rautenberg, H.J., and Wiggershaus, N., Die Himmeroder Denkschrift vom Oktober
7 950 (Karlsruhe: G. Braun, 2nd ed.,1985).
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critical German contributions to the alliance did not happen because of French
disapproval.
Thus Washington decided to send four additional divisions to Europe and
appointed General Dwight D. Eisenhower to be commander-in-chief of NATO troops in
Europe (SACEUR). But deploying these troops was perceived to be support for the short
term, gradually allowing the Europeans to become responsible for their own defense.
Deploying these six divisions represented the clearest, strongest commitment the United
States ever had toward Europe. As far as the Americans were concerned, however, this
link would not be permanent. In contrast, the European partners' main objective was
making the commitment a permanent one, even at that early point in time. The principal
function of such a commitment in the early 1950's was "duel containment" of both the
Soviet Union and the Federal Republic of Germany. 28 This became all the more
significant when West German defense contributions became America's prerequisite for
sending more troops to Europe. So the Federal Republic had benefited from the Korean
War in that it was allowed to rearm itself, although rearmament did not occur until 1955.
For the young Federal Republic of Germany, the presence of American troops
and resulting guarantee against the Soviet threat meant political stability and a gradual
introduction into the international community. The American military presence became
an important political factor in Europe and the most important structural reality in
German-American security relations.
See Hanrieder, W., Deutschland, Europa, Amerika. Die Aussenpolitik der Bundesrepublik
Deutschland 1949-1989 (Paderborn: Ferdinand Schoningh, 1991), p. 7 ff.
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B. NORTH ATLANTIC ALLIANCE STRATEGY AND WEST GERMAN
DEFENSE CONTRIBUTION (1950-1958)
1. The Defense is Going Nuclear
US foreign and security policy revision peaked when the Korean War broke out.
The new military and political program involved a military strategy that put more
emphasis on conventional defense but was still based on US nuclear superiority. The
Korean War is important because it represents an international challenge to the United
States in the form of the Soviet Union. Everyone thought that Western power would be
tied down in Asia, that the domino theory would dictate involvement in Indochina as it
had done in Korea. 29 Thus another structural basis for transatlantic security was founded:
the Pacific challenge had become a constant rival to the Atlantic. This brought up the
question of the alliance's limits. The question of NATO's operational boundaries also
came up because the Soviet challenge was a global one that did not accommodate
NATO's boundaries. As far as the Americans were concerned, this new challenge
underscored the importance of a dominating Anglo-Saxon maritime/air strategy to be able
to uphold global deterrence.
Germany remained the most important domino piece. Aforward strategy was to
be implemented as of 1950 to protect Western Europe from a looming Iron Curtain and
to meet West German security interests. The number of the forces (deployed until 1954)
See Mai, C, Westliche Sicherheitspolitik im Kalten Krieg: Der Korea-Krieg und die deutschc
Wiederbewaffnung 1950, Boppard am Rhein, 1977, pp. 23-24.
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necessary to implement this concept was established in February 1952 by the so-called
"Lisbon goals," named after the place where NATO held this council meeting. According
to the Lisbon goals, the number of existing divisions was to be increased to 96 ~ a goal
that was never achieved. 30
Meanwhile, the partners on both sides of the Atlantic once again deviated from
each other's strategic ideas. Besides expanding conventional forces, the United States
also introduced an intensive nuclear development program which led to a broad spectrum
of nuclear weapons technology in 1953. From strategic hydrogen bombs to tactical
nuclear artillery projectiles, the arsenal was quite formidable. It was an arsenal that
became the basis of a new concept known as the New Look. i] This new concept had two
simple objectives: deterring war by a threat of nuclear retaliation or winning a war with
nuclear weapons. It was hoped that this would preserve conventional forces and thus
conserve financial resources. The New Look doctrine was a break with the conventional
force goals of NSC-68. With this doctrine, American strategic thinking had returned to
the nuclear-driven idea of peripheral or maritime/air strategy. After the events of the
Korean War "the United States would no longer constrain itself to meet communist
military probes with local conventional counterforce, as it had done before." 32 Once
again, the Americans considered Europe's conventional defense to be mainly a European
30 See Haftendorn, 1 991
, p. 1 46.
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responsibility and its nuclear defense was America's. And once again, NATO's defense
plans were adapted to the military strategic and technical developments of the United
States. Nuclear and thermonuclear weapons became a part of NATO's operations plans
between 1953 and 1957. The nuclear sword of the air force represented an instant attack
on Soviet air and nuclear potential. The conventional shield forces were of drastically
reduced importance. In the operative considerations of SACEUR, General Alfred M.
Gruenther (appointed in 1953), conventional forces were a low priority. In 1950 talks
focused on defense along the Iron Curtain with forward strategy, but in 1954 the focus
was defending a line along the Weser, Fulda, and Main rivers, and the Ludwig Canal.
With a range of about 30 kilometers, the American nuclear 280mm cannons had turned
about half of West Germany into an atomic battlefield. 33 A NATO maneuver in June
1955 known as Carte Blanche provided insight as to how many German casualties could
be expected in a nuclear confrontation: through simulated nuclear air maneuvers, it was
estimated that casualties would have been in the millions. 34 The Americans did not want
their own forces in Europe to have to deal with a conventional defense; rather, American
forces were to represent a stimulus for nuclear retaliation by means of the SAC, a trip
35
wire.
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The strategic military and technological developments in the United States had
significant influence on the shift from "Forward Defense" (MC 14/1) to "Massive
Retaliation" (MC 14/2) in the 1950's, which added a nuclear component to deterrence and
defense. With the exception of the British, Western Europeans remained nuclear have
nots, without much likelihood for influential power. European dependence on the
American nuclear deterrent dominated transatlantic security relations and made
power-sharing impossible. Never did the US cede to any foreign power the authority to
launch nuclear weapons, nor would they. Such a decision rested in fact not with NATO
but with the US President, SAC, or both ~ depending on the circumstances. As a
consequence, US leadership in NATO became a structural reality and — as one sees today
— a benefit for European security.
2. Aspects of German Rearmament Between the Korean War and Entrance
into NATO (1952-1955)
The alliance's existence was dependent on the twelve German divisions to fulfill
minimum duties of NATO's nuclear-based defense in 1954. Thus, it basically did not
matter if a conventional/nuclear or purely nuclear defense was planned; the German
divisions were needed in any case.
There was no way that the new trip wire conception could possibly have been in
the interests of the West Germans, however. Because the state of conventional defense
necessitated nuclear weapons deterrence, a nuclear confrontation would have meant a
catastrophe on German soil. The Germans, therefore, fought even more for the
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conventional defense option and the forward defense associated with it. This took place
in the hope that every small-scale clash would not eventually develop into a nuclear
confrontation. The United States' conventional reduction plans and technical weapons
strategies were not the only reasons that forward defense failed in the 1950's. The
concept was never fully implemented. The British reduced their forces on the continent
in order to pay for nuclear armament. The French deployed four divisions to Algeria in
1954. 36 The number of divisions in Central Europe sank to 18 in 1956, compared with
the 54 that had been planned for this time period in 1950. German contribution remained
the heart of forward strategy, as far as the United States was concerned. America had
taken special note of West Germany's defense efforts even before official entry into
NATO. This American consideration of the German defense contribution also counts as
one of the structural foundations of American interests in Europe and continues to be
significant to this day.
West German defense contributions were not concretely defined until 1955,
despite the fact that America had openly demanded that West Germany be rearmed and
allowed to enter NATO. Before the treaty concerning Germany's admittance into NATO
could be signed in the fall of 1954, and rendered effective in May of 1955, enormous
domestic and foreign political opposition had to be overcome. The interior opposition
revolved around the question of whether associating with the West or embracing
neutrality would be more effective in attaining reunification with Soviet-occupied East
See Greiner, C, "Die militarische Eingliederung der Bundesrepublik Deutschland in die
WEU und die NATO 1954-1957,: in Militargeschichtliches Forschungsamt (ed.), Anfange
westdeutscher Sicherheitspolitik 1945-1956, Band 3, Munich, 1993, pp. 627-629.
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Germany. 37 Strong political opposition in France represented the external opposition that
had to be overcome.
In the first ten years after the war, France was afraid of a new German threat.
Therefore, the European Defense Community (EDC), which was strongly influenced by
the French, initially tried to make a German military reemergence possible only if under
French control. 38 France took seriously the threat of an American withdrawal out of
Europe in the event that the Europeans were unsuccessful in agreeing to common defense
efforts.
39 The failure of a common European defense plan in 1954 strengthened the 1950
American argument for rearming Germany under American auspices, but it especially
weakened the European idea. Solving the German question was no longer to be a
European problem, rather an Atlantic one.
The Paris Treaties (1954) between France and Germany allowed both countries
to reconcile with each other, but also set the structural foundations for disagreement
between the two over the European Europe that the French wanted and the Atlantic
For an domestic political discussion on the question of association with the West see Ehlert,
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Europe that the Federal Republic wanted. However, the Paris Treaties confirmed the
Federal Republic's association with the West, the end of occupied rule, and West
Germany's entry into the Western European Union (WEU), and later into NATO. The
development of permanent institutions also included the European Coal and Steel
Community (ECSC), which became the model for future cooperation between Germany
and France, and the first steps toward the development of a European Union. 40
The Germans, as well as the Americans, wanted Germany to be treated as an
equal among equals but French/European demands dictated that Germany receive a
discriminatory special status. Thus the EDC treaty was adhered to, which had a provision
stipulating that West Germany not manufacture or possess atomic, chemical, or biological
weapons.
To conclude, the United States, by its presence in West Germany, inherited the
duty of ensuring that the Federal Republic could not engage in any suspicious
military/political adventures. When the Federal Republic of Germany was founded, the
United States became the protector power for Germany; after Germany's entry into
NATO, this was backed by a treaty. The American troops served as a trip wire for
triggering a nuclear retaliation in case of a Soviet attack. The US took special care to link
West European defense with that of North America. This is how a nuclear unequipped
West Germany finally came under the nuclear umbrella of the United States. All in all,
Germany's admittance into NATO meant that the geopolitical heart of Western Europe
See Campbell, E.S., Germany's Past and Europe's Future (Washington:
Pergamon-Brassey' s, 1989), pp. 76-77.
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became an integral part of NATO. Furthermore, when the Geneva talks had failed,
Germany's admittance into NATO also established the European political power structure
after World War II, which lasted until the events of 1989.
C. PROBLEM AREAS OF NATO'S NUCLEAR DEVELOPMENT AND
ASPECTS OF BUILDING UP THE BUNDESWEHR (1952-1955)
German-American relations were strained in many ways toward the end of 1956;
the rearmament crisis of the German armed forces (the Bundeswehr), the Radford Plan,
and the Suez Crisis are a few examples of issues and events which posed obstacles to the
maintenance of a positive relationship. America's forced nuclearization of alliance
strategy continued to be a sore point, especially for continental Europeans. The emphasis
on nuclear weapons for Western defense continued to challenge the feasibility of
maintaining the alliance's conventional forces.
1. The Rearmament Crisis and the Radford Shock
When, beyond the alliance's limits and borders, France became more caught up
in Algeria and the British became involved in Cyprus, the German Bundeswehr inherited
a key role in Central European defense. In the eyes of the allies, however, it seemed as
though the Germans wanted to postpone the rearmament program. In 1955, for example,
605,000 troops were promised by 1958, but the Germans wanted only 323,000
redeployed by 1961. The Germans, however, assured the United States that 323,000
troops would not be the maximum number of troops. 41 The rearmament of German forces
See Greiner, "Die militarische Eingliederung der Bundesrepublik Deutschland in die WEU
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was delayed in all areas. The causes for this included not only a tight budget,42 but
continuous domestic political disputes involving a large sector of society which was and
had always been against German rearmament. This was important for the Adenauer
administration during the uncertain 1957 parliamentary elections. During NATO's
Annual Review Conference, the German government, and especially the German Minister
of Defense, Franz Josef Strauss, had to take sharp criticism from the Americans
concerning insufficient financial efforts to rebuild the German military. 43
Further American, and also British, criticism came as a result of Germany's
sluggishness in paying the costs for stationing Allied troops on German soil. The
Americans increasingly criticized the Germans for not carrying their fair share of the
financial and military burden to defend the Atlantic community. 44 This kind of
accusation, associated with the factor of burden-sharing, would become the most
important structural reality throughout NATO's history and German-American security
relations.
The question of German force contribution to NATO remains a major concern in
US-German security relations. The United States fears that today Germany could carry
und die NATO 1 954-1 957," pp. 750-751
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out further reductions of their agreed peace time ceiling of 370,000 soldiers for all
German Forces and simultaneously try to fill the gap with NATO, and especially US,
troops.
45 US military experts also fear that Germany, under the conditions of the agreed
new force structure, could transform the Bundeswehr into a "hollow army ,At that depends
significantly on mobilization, a development the US military had to experience in the
post-Vietnam War period.
In the mid-1950's, increasing stagnation of the alliance's policies were not only
evident in Germany's clumsiness in rearming or in France's and Great Britain's activities
in the Mediterranean fringes of alliance territory. The situation became more serious
when the United States, in light of President Eisenhower's doctrine of a New Look, began
to openly discuss curtailing its conventional activities in Europe. According to a New
York Times article on July 13, 1956, the Pentagon seemed quite adamant about curtailing
conventional forces by 800,000 troops. 47 The timing and the degree of curtailment, which
was largely tied to the name of Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Admiral Arthur W.
Radford, caught the West German government off guard. 48 West Germany became
involved in a fierce domestic political debate concerning the proportion of German
contribution to the alliance; the open debate in the United States reinforced the German
opposition's criticism of German rearmament. How could Chancellor Adenauer justify
See for example, Frankfurter Rundschau, "Kein Verstandnis," February 19, 1993.
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the need for a German military geared toward conventional deterrence and defense if
President Eisenhower wanted to drastically curtail American conventional efforts for the
New Look? The Radford Plan caused Bonn to become extremely distrustful, which in
turn led to a radical change in German defense policy. Among new considerations were a
reduction of compulsory military service from eighteen to twelve months, and the
possibility of a nuclear reorganization of the Bundeswehr. 49
Germany's mistrust grew when the October 1956 Suez Crisis demonstrated that
the alliance partners could not count on political consultation with the United States. 50
The Suez Crisis also demonstrated that the alliance was continuously being influenced by
the national interests of individual member states outside of alliance territory, as was the
case with French military operations in Algeria. This leads back to the consideration of
the limits of the alliance as a structural reality in NATO and transatlantic security
relations. In this case Great Britain and France wanted to respond to the nationalization
of the Suez Canal with military force, if needed. The British call for NATO solidarity in
this crisis threatened to intensify the north/south conflict within NATO. The United
States sought to play the role of neutral mediator and had condemned the hasty use of
violence.
The Suez Crisis brought about the realization of a central prerequisite for the
alliance's negotiating power, and has made NATO's reform difficult to this day. NATO
emerged as a regional security alliance necessitated by a common security threat analysis.
See Fischer, 1993, pp. 280-281.
See Thoft, B., 1 993, pp. 224-226.
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NATO did not originate from the necessity to create a political and economic union.
Efforts going beyond NATO's spatial and scope limits had to solve all internal conflicts
of interest and gave the alliance a permanent alternative: coming to a consensus by
finding a lowest common denominator, or risk a break-up of the alliance.
2. The German Conventional Option and the Alliance's Nuclear Strategy
After the New Look was implemented in NATO through NATO Strategy MC
14/2 ("Massive Retaliation"), the focus on nuclear defense increased at the expense of
conventional defense. This was widely criticized in Bonn. There was only one way out
of the cycle of nuclear deterrence (which meant nuclear defense and implied a German
nuclear wasteland): building up conventional defenses. The Radford Plan provided the
impetus for Bonn to participate in efforts aimed at the reduction and control of nuclear
weapons, rather than focusing exclusively on a nuclear defense. The Germans felt that
increased dependence on nuclear weapons would run the risk that these weapons would
be used as soon as any conflict developed. 51 In light of the Soviet satellite Sputnik liftoff
on October 4, 1957, there was another danger: decreasing trust in the reliability of
American nuclear protection for Western Europe. If it was expected that United States
soil was no longer invulnerable to nuclear attack, the US would have decided to respond
to the threat of nuclear weapon deployment only if its own vital interests were at stake. 52
It was feared that a regional conflict, one involving Berlin for example, would not justify
using nuclear weapons. As a result of these fears, the French started thinking about
51
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obtaining their own nuclear forces and emphasizing closer relations with the continental
European NATO states. Adenauer thought about this goal too, considering a review of
the international ban on Germany producing NBC weapons." Tactical nuclear weapons
were more important to him than German nuclear-equipped long-range bombers and
rockets. Temporary nuclear euphoria even allowed him to go so far as to talk about
nuclear hand-held weapons to make up for reduced conventional forces. 54
The already mentioned open harmony between German and French defense
expectations strengthened the American justification of its policy for European interests,
but did not stop France from pursuing its own nuclear program. Germany, which ended
up not possessing nuclear weapons, had gained more of a voice in nuclear affairs as a
result of the creation of a Nuclear Planning Group (NPG) in 1966.
D. GERMAN-FRENCH RELATIONS AND THE QUESTION OF THE
CONTROL OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS (1958-1964)
The United States was becoming increasingly concerned with the fact that
Franco-German relations were improving over the transatlantic problem areas mentioned
previously, which seemed to promise the creation of a "Paris-Bonn Axis." 55
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Like many Europeans, Americans were surprised and concerned by the
Franco-German Treaty of Cooperation signed by de Gaulle and Adenauer on
January 22, 1963, during Adenauer's official visit to Paris. Adenauer's great respect
for de Gaulle and his desire to use their friendship to bring Germany and France
together were well known. The treaty came so soon after de Gaulle vetoed British
entry into the Common Market that his move had the aura of German approval, or
at least acquiescence. The US government had been particularly disturbed by the
anti-American implications of the press conference in January 1963 at which de
Gaulle pronounced his veto. Germany was concerned about the effect of the treaty
on German relations with the United States and on NATO, from which France was
in the process of disengaging.
56
George McGhee, US ambassador to Bonn, expressed concern over a common
Franco-German, anti-NATO, and anti-American policy. This represented another
cornerstone in German-American relations that had from the beginning been a headache.
American uneasiness concerning the establishment of the Franco-German Eurocorps
(1991-1992) is the best recent example. The fact that Germany's Atlantic partnership
with the United States was never doubted meant that its concurrent reconciliation and
cooperation with its European neighbor France, which had withdrawn from NATO in
1966, was a constant political juggle.
President John F. Kennedy wanted to hinder such a special relationship between
Germany and France by creating an "Atlantic Partnership" and promising a united Europe
equal rights of co-determination, especially in nuclear affairs. Moreover, the widely
discussed Multilateral Nuclear Force (MLF) in the beginning of the 1960s (1959-1964)
was supposed to hinder West German nuclear ambitions as well as make it unnecessary




Berlin crisis (1958-1961), increased presence of American troops was supposed to
convince West Germany that the US was still acting in Germany's best interests.
The increase of American troops in Germany had another purpose. The Soviet
Union's development of intercontinental missiles meant that US territory was now
vulnerable; thus the strategy of Massive Retaliation was no longer feasible. This strategy
had been subject to widespread criticism for allowing little or no options even before
Sputnik (1957). 57 From a German point of view, there was still doubt, based on
America's vulnerability, that the US would employ its strategic systems should a conflict
arise. From the American point of view, the existence of their nuclear weapons was
based on a military strategy to safeguard alliance interests and to avoid conflict with the
Soviet Union after reaching a nuclear stalemate. Since the end of the 1950's, the US
considered itself to be confronted with its own nuclear dilemma: wanting to have the
weapons to contain Soviet influence and at the same time wanting to reduce the risk of
nuclear involvement. The Federal Republic and its European alliance partners have since
considered themselves vulnerable to removal from the US nuclear umbrella. US policy
toward the other nuclear superpower, now geared more toward global stability, did not
necessarily correspond to the Federal Republic's perception of its regional interests.
Flexible Response Strategy (MC 14/3, 1961/1967-1991) was a deviation from the
quality of nuclear guaranty envisaged in the Massive Retaliation Strategy, and afforded
conventional forces a more significant role. 58 Conventional forces were to no longer be a
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trip wire, but gain the ability to halt aggression and, if possible, end a conflict without
using nuclear weapons. This American change of course, adapting to the political and
military orientation of the Soviet Union, brought forth new doubts in Germany. On the
one hand the now necessary conventional forces were supposed to be sufficient to stop a
quick strike of Soviet troops. On the other, as far as the Germans were concerned, these
troops were in no way a replacement for nuclear retaliation. Had this been the case, a war
would have been regionally limited, and the United States would have been spared the
effects of a nuclear war, but Germany, as the potential battlefield, would have been razed
to the ground.
This is why West Germany pushed for nuclear participation. The MLF was an
opportunity to do just that. With the formation of the MLF, Bonn hoped to become
involved in nuclear deployment and planning operations. 59
However limited its military functions, the MLF would be an effective
symbol of American-European interdependence. It is very likely that, at least in
1963, this was the most important German motive for supporting the MLF, not
merely the most frequently voiced. An interest in entering the nuclear business
would necessarily be much less publicly voiced, but there is little reason to suppose
that this was the 'real' motive; the indications are that in the circumstances of 1963,
with the 'first-things-first' mood of German officials, the interest in strengthening
Atlantic interdependence was in fact the overriding objective of German policy on
the MLF. 60
When the MLF failed in 1964/65, the Federal Republic retained carrier weapons,
but their warheads remained under American control. Membership in the Nuclear
See Kelleher, CM., Germany and the Politics of Nuclear Weapons (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1975), pp. 228-269.
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Richardson, 1966, p. 70.
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Planning group remained important for Germany in order to have its nuclear interests
represented. The MLF proved that the Atlantic partnership had the highest priority for
the Federal Republic, despite the threat of French intrusion.
E. BURDEN-SHARING AND THE FEAR OF AMERICAN WITHDRAWAL
FROM EUROPE
Not only in present times have Europeans, especially the Germans, worried that the
Americans' changing national interests would cause them to turn away and withdraw
from Europe. It was, after all, Thomas Jefferson who coined the phrase entangling
alliances. Giving up the Atlantic alliance in favor of returning to an isolationist policy
has since WWII been tied with to the European fear of once again being abandoned to an
unsure fate.
In the mid-1960's, the first substantial reduction of American troops in Europe took
place. Significantly reduced tensions between East and West in the wake of the Cuban
Missile Crisis and improved strategic air transport capabilities made this move possible.
The Vietnam War made it necessary. On the one hand, personnel in Germany were
withdrawn because they were needed in Vietnam. On the other, they were withdrawn
because of budget constraints. These budget constraints led to American troops in
Germany being reduced from 280,000 to 265,000. 61 The US balance of payments deficit
was growing at the same rate Western Europe was recovering economically from the
consequences of World War II. Because of the subsiding East-West conflict and
See Haftendorn, 1991, p. 138.
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improved crisis management capability, the circles in Washington that wanted further
reduction of American troops in Europe gained more influence. Influential Senator
Mansfield, for example, insisted that American troops in Europe be substantially reduced,
pointing to an unequal burden-sharing in the alliance. He introduced an amendment in
1 968 based on this argument which called for American troops to be reduced to 50,000
that same year.
If such actions were political warning signs for Western Europe, then the offset
payments in the 1960's had a much more concrete meaning for Germany, as evidenced by
the following quote from George McGhee:
The United States, in light of its balance of payments problems, could not
continue the present rate of military expenditures abroad. We had already taken
concrete steps to improve our position, as recently reported by the President to the
Congress. We appreciated greatly the assistance that Germany had rendered in the
past through the offset purchases of military equipment. It was, however,
absolutely essential that we receive as an offset the full amount of our dollar
expenditures in Germany --$1.3 billion in the next two years, not the $1 billion that
had been suggested by the Germans. 62
For the first time, a correlation between currency offset and troop deployment had
been established. Chancellor Ludwig Erhard's administration, fighting budget difficulties
of its own, had such problems with this in 1 966 that the administration fell apart and had
to form a grand coalition with the SPD.
The offset payments created an exceptional example of the burden-sharing problem,
because the payments were made only by Germany. Besides being financially
burdensome, these arrangements were also difficult because the principle of equal rights
McGhee, 1989, pp. 90-91.
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and fair treatment had from the beginning been seen as a prerequisite for a German
military contribution. Not until later was German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt able to
eliminate such special treatment of this financial matter.
61
This did not solve the fundamental problem of burden-sharing. The problem was
and is difficult to solve because NATO members' individual interests will not allow for
simply balancing out costs with alliance membership. The United States, however,
pressed for a more fair distribution of duties and responsibilities within the Atlantic
alliance well into the 1980's. The burden-sharing debate thus became a burden to the
alliance. American demands for more European solidarity remained closely tied with the
American presence in Europe. A good example for the burden-sharing debate is the
"Stoessel Demarche" of November 1980, named after the US ambassador to the Federal
Republic, in which West Germans were asked to contribute more. Subsequently, a treaty
on "Wartime Host Nation Support" (WHNS) came about. According to this treaty, the
Federal Republic declared itself ready to supply personnel and facilities to support
American reinforcement units in case of a crisis. The NATO infrastructure program of
1984, the establishment of Patriot air defense systems, and last, but not least, European
willingness to deploy intermediate-range missiles in August 1983 led to a temporary
quieting of the debate during the last phases of the Cold War. 64
See Schmidt, H., Menschen und Machte (Berlin: Siedler 1987), pp. 215-216.
See Inacker, M.J., "Die europaische Leistung: Lastenteilung als EinfluRfaktor auf die
amerikanische Prasenz," in Mahnke, 1991, pp. 524-527.
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Other events, such as the 1973 Yom-Kippur War, Lebanon, Grenada, Libya, and
Panama, had already shown how significant burden-sharing would be in the future. The
United States constantly confronted the Federal Republic with the expectation of
supporting the United States in conflicts even outside alliance territory. This was a
constant thorn in the side of Bonn. On one hand, West German forces could be deployed
outside alliance territory. On the other, characteristic of German-American security
relations, the German public has always deeply mistrusted American military intervention
in crisis areas outside of NATO territory. As former Defense Minister Georg Leber put
it, this led to the Germans renouncing such US actions three times "even before the cock
crows the first time" 65 rather than automatically going along with them to make
maintenance of the alliance easier. An equally mistrustful Washington sometimes also
neglected to promptly let NATO members know of its own national military operations.
The burden-sharing debate went on until 1988, and the demise of the Warsaw Pact
as a military threat. The end of the threat meant that NATO lost the outside pressure that
motivated solidarity in the alliance. Since then, burden-sharing, such a fundamental
factor in German-American security relations, has taken on a whole new meaning, with
new consequences to be considered. This became clear with regard to the Gulf War, as
the following pages suggest.
Quoted by Schweigler, C, "Die Politik der Bundesrepublic Deutschland als Faktor
amerikanischer Politik," Mahnke, 1991, pp. 487-488.
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F. DETENTE AND DETERRENCE
No subject in German-American security relations better demonstrates the
structural contrast between US global interests and West Germany's mainly regional
interests than the attitude toward the Soviet Union concerning detente and deterrence.
West Germany's fear of sacrificing German security interests on the superpowers' altar of
strategic balance is seen throughout German-American post-WWII relations. 66
Interestingly enough, these German-American conflicts of interest had
characteristics that varied with the political climate. Wanting to turn more to the West,
Adenauer pressed for a tougher policy toward the Soviet Union, especially during the
Berlin Crisis and the building of the Berlin Wall that followed soon after. A cautious and
reserved American policy toward the Soviet Union, especially when tensions were easing
after Stalin's death, made Bonn fear Germany's becoming neutral as a result of American
policy.
67
The Willy Brandt chancellorship during the early 1970's had exactly the opposite
view. 68 Motivated by Kennedy's foreign policy, Willy Brandt, together with Egon Bahr
(Brandt's close assistant in Berlin in the 1950s and later in the Chancellor's Office)
developed a policy of "change by approaching" the East, or Ostpolitik. b9 Now it was the
See Hacke, C, "Die Entscheidung fur die politische Westbindung nach 1945," in Zitelmann,
R., Weissmann, K., and Grossheim, M., Westbindung (Frankfurt/M.: Propylaen, 1993), pp. 139-144.
67 See Richardson, 1966, p. 60.
See Craig, G.A., and George, A.L., Force and Statecraft (New York: Oxford University Press,
1990), p. 137.
See Herf, J., War by Other Means, Soviet Power, West German Resistance, and the Battle of
the Euromissiles (New York: Free Press, 1991), pp. 32-43.
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West Germans who were establishing a policy to ease relations with the East as well as
Washington, where there was a mistrustful reaction. "Brandt and Bahr accumulated a
host of critics who believed that the intentions and certainly the consequences of their
policies would in fact lead to a revival of German nationalism, neutralism, and a
loosening of West Germany's Atlantic ties." 70
The conflict that had the most consequences for German-American security
relations in early NATO history originated out of differing interests and concerns of both
countries involving the Soviet Union. This conflict took place when President Carter and
Chancellor Helmut Schmidt were in office. Both seemed to agree that German-American
relations were never worse than they were in the late 1970's.
71 The Neutron Bomb Affair
also played a role in this, although this incident will not be explored any further here. 72
Easing tensions between West Germany and the Soviet Union have continued to
play a role in German politics since 1970. The climax of this development was the CSCE
Final Act in Helsinki in the summer of 1975. As far as the Americans were concerned,
their relations with the Soviet Union were completely dependent on the outcome of the
SALT II negotiations. SALT II was also in German interests. Schmidt wanted the SALT
II negotiations to include the Soviet Backfire bomber. He was even more concerned with
Ibid., p. 39.
See Schweigler, 1991, p. 503.
See Herf, 1991, pp. 60-62.
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discussing the recent deployment of Soviet SS-20 intermediate-range missiles as a key
issue for the treaty.
73
In contrast to President Gerald Ford, President Jimmy Carter did not want to
include the Soviet SS-20 missiles, which were a threat only to Europe, in the
negotiations. Schmidt suspected that these weapons were being used for the political
blackmail of Europe, and that Carter was interested only in the security of his own
country. Schmidt had the following to say about this: "I was fed up with Brzezinski and
Carter, who had told me that the Russian SS-20 did not matter at all...they didn't
understand that the SS-20 was a political threat, political blackmail against Germany
most of all and later on against others in Europe..." 74
In strengthening his demands that the SS-20 missiles be included in SALT II
negotiations, Schmidt addressed the issue in his famous October 1977 London speech at
the International Institute for Strategic Studies. Chancellor Schmidt said:
Changed strategic conditions confront us with new problems. SALT codifies
the nuclear strategic balance between the Soviet Union and the United States. To
put it another way: SALT neutralized their strategic nuclear capabilities. In Europe
this magnifies the significance of the disparities between East and West in nuclear
tactical and conventional systems. 75
Schmidt's London speech, calling attention to the political implications of an
imbalance in intermediate-range nuclear weapons, was surely a turning point in the
See Schmidt, 1987, p. 64.
Quoted from Herf, 1991, p. 54.
Ibid., p. 55.
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history of the Cold War in Europe, and in the rhythms of global politics in general. This
speech led directly to the "two-track" NATO decision of December 1979 and the
deployments of 108 Pershing II missiles and 464 cruise missiles on West European soil in
1983. 76
The Euromissile dispute was significant for two reasons. First, West Germany,
previously suspected of indifference, had confirmed that it was aligned with the West and
NATO. Second, the Soviet Union's strategy of threatening with their SS-20 missiles had
failed; the Soviets had thus reached the limits of their strategic and geopolitical
competitiveness.
The missile deployments of fall 1983 completed a reversal in the global
balance of forces that began with Chancellor Helmut Schmidt's speech in London
in October 1977. These deployments dealt Soviet foreign policy one of its most
decisive defeats of the postwar era, and were the indispensable precondition for the
INF Treaty of December 1987. The Western victory of fall 1983 may have
contributed to the emergence of 'new thinking' in the Soviet Union and to the
subsequent collapse of communist dictatorships in Eastern Europe. 77
In October 1986 in Reykjavik, Reagan and Gorbachev discussed the disarmament
of all intermediate-range missiles in Europe. In the winter of 1987 they came to an
agreement, the "zero-zero option" 78 . This is further proof that the United States had given
higher priority to its own security interests on a global strategic level, in contrast to the
regional interests of its Western European alliance partners. The "zero-zero option,"
See Schweigler, 1991, p. 509.
Herf 1991, p. 226.
See Nogee and Donaldson, 1992, pp. 368-369.
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which involved the disarmament of all nuclear systems not only between 1,000 and 5,000
km but also over 500 km, underlines the US effort since the 1960's to limit as much as
possible its own risk of being involved in a nuclear confrontation in Europe. One might
even conclude that the INF Treaty represented the beginning of the end of American
nuclear guarantees for Europe.
According to West European strategic thought, the American intermediate-range
missiles stationed in Europe served to deter a Soviet attack, particularly by being coupled
with American strategic nuclear potential. Withdrawing these systems would thus have
to lead to a reduction in the alliance's deterrence capabilities.
79 The Germans were
worried about the inclusion of "their" Pershing IA, just as they had been concerned about
tactical weapons in the mid-1950's. The old principle was once again in effect: the
shorter the range, the greater the impact on German security. 80
The breakup of the Warsaw Pact and Soviet Union spared NATO and
German-American security relations a further test, which would inevitably have dealt
with the question of modernizing the remaining nuclear systems. NATO put off the 1983
Montebello modernization decision in the summer of 1989. 81 Both sides of the Atlantic
have avoided the topic of extended deterrence for protecting Europe ever since.
See Pond, E., "Sind wir verraten und verkauft?" in DIE ZEIT, 2b June 1 987.
See Schweigler, 1991, p. 518.
Ibid., p. 519.
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Reykjavik was not only the beginning of denuclearization, as far as the INF was
concerned; it was also a contributing reason for forming a "European defense identity." 82
Reykjavik was the latest point at which the West European allies perceived that the US
would remain ready to safeguard Europe's strategic protection, but that this readiness
would be linked to a policy of decreased responsibility with regard to the alliance in
Europe. What strengthened this belief even further was the SDI program, which many
Germans felt would form an umbrella over the USA while leaving the Europeans in the
(nuclear) rain. 83 It was clear that the Europeans would have to intensify their own efforts.
Evidence of these European efforts have, since 1987, come in the form of the revival of
the Western European Union (WEU), the development of a common European foreign
and security policy within the framework of the European Community (EC), today's
European Union (EU), and, finally, the establishment of the Eurocorps.M All of these
developments increased European self-reliance and caused new transatlantic difficulties,
as evidenced by the dispute over the Franco-German Eurocorps initiative. 85
See Ruhl, L, "Die geopolitische Frage Europas und die Grundlage einer europaischen
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As mentioned earlier, the Eurocorps was a new occasion for old worries. In 1963,
the Americans were concerned about a reconciliation between Germany and France.
Now the Americans were afraid that the Franco-German Eurocorps project would again
weaken NATO and loosen German integration into the alliance.
G. AFTER THE WALL CAME DOWN: THE UNITED STATES AND
GERMANY'S UNIFICATION
That the United States was a power representing protection and support became
clearer than ever during German reunification in 1989 and 1990. A hastily concluded
Two-Plus-Four Treaty, which gave Germany its full sovereignty, would have been
impossible without American support. 86 One of the deciding factors for the Americans
was that a reunified Germany would remain a member ofNATO. 87
The Bush administration considered it a high priority to keep reunified Germany
from turning away from the West. It was important to maintain good relations with
reunified Germany, which suddenly became the greatest power east of Washington and
west of Moscow. It was mentioned at the beginning of this chapter that America had
challenged Bonn to be a "partner in leadership." This was not only important for the
Bush administration's above-mentioned interests; it is also an expression of an American
See Merkl, P., German Unification in the European Context (Pennsylvania State University
Press, 1993), pp. 355-359.
See Ackermann, A., and Kelleher, C, "The United States and the German Question:
Building a New European Order," in Verheyen, D., and Soe, C. (eds.), The Germans and Their
Neighborsi Boulder: Westview Press, 1993), p. 416.
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expectation that the US would not be the one to carry the burden of responsibility for
Germany and Europe in the future, as was the case during the Cold War. This
expectation was doomed to go unfulfilled. This is one of the most important lessons the
Transatlantic alliance must learn in the post-Cold War era.
Being named a "partner in leadership" was as big a surprise to Germany as
reunification. Since the end of World War II, a special relationship between Germany's
citizens and force and statecraft has been created. As long as a potential front line ran
through the middle of Germany, Germans in former West Germany had been prepared to
accept the costs resulting from the East-West confrontation and the need to maintain a
defense contribution. These German forces existed only as a part of the greater NATO
military organization, and there was no independent General Staff from which to
coordinate exclusively German military operations.. Hence, not only would the then
500,000 man strong Bundeswehr not have been capable of carrying out a self-reliant
military operation, but there was also the suggestion that Germany was not responsible
for itself, relying on the actions of NATO to provide protection. The Germans saw
NATO as a kind of insurance policy, where one contributes a certain amount to the
insurance company, who will cover the costs of a future emergency. NATO, as the
insurer of West Germany, was responsible for handling all of activities involving a claim,
as it were. The Federal Republic therefore considered NATO, and mainly the United
States, responsible for its security. 88
See Feldmeyer, 1993, pp. 470-471.
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This attitude originated from past experience: after experiencing war twice this
century, many Germans desire not to have military power, which they see as a guarantee
that the state will not abuse it. 89 The forty-year period of West German foreign and
security policy involving limited sovereignty was attractive for many Germans because
they could leave existential matters to others, especially the United States.
Thus reunification has meant the end of a special role for Germany. For the
Germans this means that they must find their way around in a political reality which,
since 1945, they thought they had escaped. The 1991 Gulf War, for instance, caught the
Germans completely off guard. They learned a bitter lesson: that war is still a political
instrument and is, under certain conditions, justified.
H. CONCLUSIONS
After World War II ended, the United States was not especially willing to take over
the role of world leader. The American role as a European power in an entangling
alliance contradicted an apparently sacred isolationist tradition. But this role was
unavoidable in the face of looming Soviet expansionism. After all, nobody wanted to
repeat the mistakes of 1923 and leave Europe to an unsure future again.
The "grand strategy" of the United States not only included democracy but free
market economies and establishing an open world economic system for military and
political containment of the Soviet Union. The combination of military alliances and
See Baumgartner, H.M., and Wellershoff, D. (eds.), Frieden ohne Macht? (Bonn: Bouvier,
1991).
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footholds around the Eurasian power block, military strategies, and forces as well as arms
control treaties held a global opponent (the Soviet Union) in check. These factors
threatened to severely limit the Soviet Union's offensive option to unilaterally change the
post-war order of Yalta while at the same time providing security to the allies in Europe,
especially the Germans in the Federal Republic.
The principle of this "grand strategy" remained in effect for nearly a half century.
Only the means and methods changed; the all-important role of nuclear weapons, a
centerpiece of almost every strategy debate, was key in all phases of American post-war
policy. Conflicts over the question of means and methods repeatedly arose, especially in
the Atlantic community. The strategic interests of the European allies, whose main goal
was to prevent a regional war in Central Europe, was destined to clash with the global
interests of the United States. This was especially true for the nation whose territory
would have become the primary battlefield: the Federal Republic of Germany. This
explains why the Federal Republic constantly worried about becoming victim to the
strategic goals of the United States, whose security interests included both regional and
global crises. The differing strategic and operative views were also of critical
importance. The maritime/air strategy of the US had always been an expression of a
limited commitment; it allowed for a prompt response to a crisis as well as a prompt
disengagement. The same could be said of the peripheral/indirect defense method, in
which one seeks to avoid a direct and bloody confrontation with the opponent on the
battlefield. There was no way that these methods could have been pursued by
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conventional means. For the United States, the key piece in its foreign policy strategy
has been and continues to be the atom bomb, both as a threat to be used and a
consequence to be avoided
Germany's membership in the Atlantic alliance was not only in Adenauer's
interests. The rearming of occupied and demilitarized West Germany was not a goal of
the United States in the period after World War II, but the Korean War created a new
structural reality. German membership in NATO and close security ties with the United
States were a necessity for the US, and became a blessing for the Federal Republic.
German security would bear a price for Germany, however, and debate over
burden-sharing began, at the latest, in the 1960's. Although threatened many times in
order to achieve a more "fair" sharing of the security burden, a significant American
withdrawal never took place before the events of 1989.
There was also a correlation between burden-sharing and the regional and political
limits of the alliance. Solidarity among NATO members was required when operating
outside alliance territory (out-of-area), and was proven necessary when participant
nations began to act based upon their own national interests. The worldwide containment
of the Soviet Union necessarily led to the withdrawal of troops from Europe during the
Vietnam War, when US troops were needed elsewhere. Western Europe is now looking,
with a certain degree of uneasiness, at the scale of the American military presence in the
Atlantic and Pacific regions in order to determine where the predominant American
interests lie.
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NATO owes most of its success during the Cold War to the fact that the members
not only defined their interests, but found the common will to pull together to pursue
those interests. Furthermore, it was crucial that there was agreement on the United States
taking on the leadership role in the alliance. The future ofNATO, as well as the future of
close German-American security relations, will in particular depend on whether the
necessary harmony of interests among NATO members can be achieved in the future.
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III. THE POST-COLD WAR ERA: GERMAN-AMERICAN SECURITY
RELATIONS IN LIGHT OF CURRENT CHALLENGES
The end of the East-West confrontation seemed to leave the US with no focus for
its deterrent efforts. Initially, the sudden disappearance of the former global opponent
seemed to have moved a crucial step closer to ever-lasting peace. Euphoria soon turned
to concern, however. This was not the end of history dealt with by Francis Fukuyama,
nor is it likely to come in the foreseeable future.
00 On the contrary, the collapse of the
USSR has opened a Pandora's box of nationalist, fundamentalist, secular, and ethnic
animosities long overshadowed by the Cold War. These animosities present the most
immediate threat to international stability. Additionally, power struggles have emerged
to fill vacuums created by the collapse of the former USSR. Against all wishful thinking,
there is a New World Disorder that confronts not only NATO but also the UN with new
challenges.
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To the UN, the end of the East-West conflict also means the end of a period marked
by the inability to act. In Europe, the Cold War and the Iron Curtain resulted in rigid
positions and a razor-sharp division. Conflicts were pursued in other corners of the globe
and, in simplified terms, called "proxy wars." Wherever the antagonists encountered each
See Fukuyama, F., "The End of History?" in The National Interest, Summer 1989, pp. 3-18.
See Jowitt, K., New World Disorder-The Leninist Extinction (Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1992), pp. 306- 331.
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other, the UN Security Council was paralyzed by the veto power of members in
* 92
opposition.
As a result of Russia's new willingness to cooperate, the Security Council became a
place where positive action can be taken, and the UN can now be seen as a vehicle
through which to attempt the management of global crises.. With respect to
American-German security relations, the UN became a frame of reference in addition to
NATO.
Through unification, the Federal Republic of Germany not only became a larger
and sovereign nation, but it also had to assume a larger portion of international
responsibility. The crisis in the Gulf, at the Horn of Africa, and in the Balkans were
moments of truth for Germany. It was no longer a matter of the allies coming to
Germany's defense at its inner border; rather, Germany was now expected to contribute
its share to international crisis management, even outside NATO's area of responsibility.
The roles that were played by the US and Germany in these crises, and the conclusions to
be drawn with respect to American-German security relations are the subject of this
chapter.
See Schmidt, R., "Das Instrumentarium der Vereinten Nationen zum Kriesenmanagement
und seine Entwicklung in den letzten lahren," in Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (ed.),
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A. THE PERSIAN GULF WAR
1. Operation Desert Storm: A Case of Maritime-Air Strategy
On August 2, 1990, Iraqi military forces poured across the frontier and
quickly occupied the tiny oil-rich state of Kuwait. President Bush quickly declared
the annexation of what Iraqi President Saddam Hussein called the 'nineteenth
province of Iraq' an unacceptable act of aggression. Reviving the moribund
collective security provisions of the United Nations, Bush called on the nations of
the world to join the Americans in reinstating Kuwait sovereignty. Secretary of
State James Baker was dispatched to enlist volunteers; in the end, a coalition of
thirty states stood opposite the Iraqi lines. Standing rhetorically with the coalition
was the former Soviet Union.
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Only a few days after Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, President George Bush, in a
speech before Congress noted the requirement of creating "a new world order in which
the nations of the world, East and West, North and South, can prosper and live in
harmony." 94 The role of force and the role of the United States in this "new world order"
were reflected in an exemplary way in the Gulf War.
The reason for the United States' intervention in the Gulf was its strategic
interest in securing the oil wells that provide the western industrial nations with an
essential portion of their energy. Saddam Hussein's disregard of that interest earned him
punishment by military means. Unlike America's Vietnam experience, the Gulf War
exploited the full conventional potential of the US arsenal. Since it was a coalition army
that had to be commanded and controlled, it was inevitable to reduce objectives to
Snow, D.M., Distant Thunder. Third World Conflict and the New International Order (New
York: St. Martin' s Press, 1 993), p. 1 81
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essentials. Many different interests, including regional interests, had to be reconciled. 95
Hence, the basic focus of the coalition effort was on restoring Kuwait's sovereignty,
bringing hostilities to an early end, and, in the American view, rapidly pulling the US
forces out of the theater. Before long, the failure to reach agreement on eradicating the
fundamental cause of the problem, Saddam Hussein, proved to be a serious mistake.
Having overcome the former bipolar division in the world community, the
United States was in a position, in this first war of the post-Cold War era, to pursue the
classical approach to maintaining a balance of power that has been pursued for the past
two centuries. The United States, as England in the past, has two global monopolitical
advantages that perfectly lend themselves to a maritime strategy. On one hand, the
United States is the only nation to still retain the military resources required for global
power projection — similar to England with her fleet in the past. 96 On the other, given the
demise of the Soviet ballistic missile threat, the US has regained the relative
invulnerability of a maritime power protected by surrounding seas. Invulnerability and
the potential for power projection provide the United States with options no other power
in the world has. Invulnerability engenders independence and self-assurance. One can
afford to maintain alliances, to join ad hoc coalitions like the one in the Gulf, or to act on
one's own. As with Great Britain in the past, the potential for power projection has
always permitted intervening in any corner of the world without having to maintain a
See Snow, 1993, p. 186.
See Howard, M., The Continental Commitment. The Dilemma of British Defense Policy in
the Era of the Two World Wars (London: Ashfield Press, 1972).
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presence in a variety of theaters. The best and, arguably, the last example, considering
the magnitude of the operation, is the Persian Gulf War, which involved the deployment
of 500,000 US military personnel. Notwithstanding the United States' intention to use its
potential for intervention to fight no more than two regional wars at any one time in the
future,
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it does retain recourse to implementing the "British Strategy." This strategy is
global but discriminating, as will be highlighted in discussing the war in the Balkans.
The Persian Gulf War has shown that the United States wants, and is able, to
play the part of a world policeman only in the case of crises that are deemed to involve
US interests. Also, the US will assume this task only if other nations, too, provide their
financial or military contributions. This requirement also casts a new light upon the issue
of burden-sharing.
As far as the liberation of Kuwait was concerned, ideal preconditions existed for
the application of military means in the New World Order. What was at stake was a
strategically important raw material in a strategically important region where three
continents meet. There also lingered a supraregional threat stemming from Iraq's
impending nuclear arms buildup. The UN Security Council condemned the Iraqi attack
on Kuwait, and approved a liberation operation through an ad hoc coalition, the nerve
center of which, however, was not in New York, but in Washington.
The Persian Gulf War clearly showed that the American "Grand Strategy" of the
Cold War had to undergo a thorough review. In the future, the United States would have
See Aspin, L, "The Bottom-Up Review: Forces for a New Era." September 1, 1993, and
Gordon, M.R., "Pentagon Seeking to Cut Military but Equip it for 2 Regional Wars," in The New York
Times, September 2, 1993, p. A1.
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to place increased emphasis on its ability to prevent regional crisis or to solve such crisis
by using military force, if required. 98 The criteria governing such a mission have been
highlighted previously, but one must also consider the domestic pressure on the
leadership in Washington to reduce America's foreign commitments
2. The Germans to the Front
During the Persian Gulf War, the Germans once again drew heavy criticism to
themselves. The media of the western allies denounced the Germans as being ungrateful,
maintaining that the allies had done everything they could to help bring about German
unification." There was mention of the "shirking of responsibility" and "checkbook
diplomacy," but the main accusation was that Germany did not exhibit common
command responsibility within the alliance framework. The way Germany acted, they
were quick to state, "has also demonstrated that many Germans, like the Japanese, remain
transfixed by years of postwar conditioning to view their country as an economic giant
but a political dwarf." 100
When the United States counted its allies at the beginning of the Gulf conflict,
Germany initially kept a very low profile. There soon emerged the old alliance of the
United States, England, and France, while Germany, along with Japan, was sharply
See Pocalyko, M.N., "Riding on the Storm: The Influence of War on Strategy," in Tritten, J. J.,
and Stockton, P.N., Reconstituting America's Defense. The New US National Security Strategy
(New York: Praeger, 1992), pp. 53-56.
See Schierwater, H.-V., "Deutschland, der Golf und die Allianz-Fragen an die deutsche
AuBenpolitik," in Rissener Rundbrief, April (4), 1991, p. 85.






criticized in America. It was pointed out that Germany, considering American support
since the end of World War II, and recent German economic prosperity, had every reason
to shoulder Gulf War burdens with the United States. The Germans could find little
solace in the fact that the Japanese, whose interests in the Gulf region were affected much
more directly and whose constitutional considerations were drastically different than
those of Germany, at times came under even sharper attacks. 101
For Germany, the Persian Gulf War was totally unexpected. The Germans
would realize once again that "playing an active part in world affairs was not confined to
a politically friendly environment."
10
It should also be mentioned, however, that
Germany was confronted with the Persian Gulf crisis during a period of difficulties
arising from the process of German Unification.
At that time, Bonn's options were limited in several respects. On one hand, it
had to follow the escalation of the situation in the Baltic states, where the moribund
Soviet Union was making a violent last-ditch attempt to keep the empire from falling
apart.
10? At the same time, the German unification process, the importance of which was
totally underestimated by the outside world, 104 had to be implemented at the domestic
level and secured at the international level. From the German point of view, it was
,0 ' See Merkl, 1993, pp. 16-22.
Hondrich, O., "Der Golfkrieg hat die Friedfertigkeit der Deutschen erschiittert," in
Frankfurter Rundschau, January 14, 1992, p. 9.
See Lieven, A., The Baltic Revolution: Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and the Path to
Independence (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1993), pp. 244-254.
See Zehrer, H. (ed.), Der Golfkonflikt: Dokumentation, Analyse und Bewertung aus
mi Iitarischer S/'chf (Herfbrd: Mittler, 1992), p. 307.
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particularly important to proceed cautiously and to allay the global uneasiness about a
both economically and politically strong Germany.
As a matter of fact, Germany did provide significant assistance to the coalition
forces operating in the Persian Gulf region. The initial deployment of the US troops from
Germany and, indeed, Operation Desert Storm itself, would probably not have been
possible without German assistance. Prior to providing that assistance, though, the
Germans had temporarily been tongue-tied and paralyzed. The lesson to be learned in
view of the future of American-German cooperation can only be: "Better not to hesitate to
do what needs to be done anyway and walk away with a bonus, than act belatedly and get
no credit at all."
105
The major part of Germany's contribution was financial aid, which led to the
already mentioned accusation of Germany pursuing a checkbook diplomacy. According
to a cost breakdown by Michael J. Inacker, the financial contribution totaled 17 billion
German marks as of April 1991. Of this amount, about 3.5 billion German marks were
paid to the allies as direct military assistance. 106 Considering the fact that the amount of
17 billion German marks, which is more than one third of the total annual defense budget,
suffices to maintain a full-strength armored division of 18,000 personnel for 20 years or
to maintain the entire Federal Armed Forces, or Bundeswehr, for more than six months, 107
one becomes aware of the actual magnitude of Germany's contribution. Yet something
105
Joffe, )., 1991, p. 218.




else was expected of Germany, something money cannot buy, namely, sending troops to
fight and risk their lives. "The Germans to the front!" This is what was expected of a
united Germany. Sending just one tank battalion to the Persian Gulf would probably
have sufficed to live up to expectations. Both the government and the domestic
opposition maintained, however, that the legal situation ruled out any participation of
German armed forces in the liberation of Kuwait. Committing German soldiers abroad
was considered in line with the constitution only as long as such commitment served to
defend, if only indirectly, the Federal Republic of Germany. This would have been the
case had Iraq, during the Persian Gulf crisis, attacked, for instance, NATO member
Turkey. 108 What held true for this Turkish scenario did not in the case of Kuwait. The
legal aspects of committing German troops, particularly in out-of area missions, will be
discussed in more detail in the context of the case study on Somalia.
In the early 1990s, the Persian Gulf War rekindled the debate over
burden-sharing and solidarity within the alliance. As the Korean War had shown: war
creates reality. In the final analysis, the latest confrontation in the Persian Gulf has
created the need for a basic redetermination of a fair and just sharing of financial burdens
and responsibilities between the United States and the European allies. From the
American angle, this was urgently needed in view of the US economic situation
increasingly demanding cuts in the defense budget. All of this was possible because the
Soviet Union, and later Russia, had switched from confrontation to cooperation. Also,
SeeZehrer, 1992, p. 310.
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the Americans considered it appropriate, because the Europeans seemed to become
stronger economically and to be determined to engage in wider political cooperation. 109
The Federal Republic of Germany will ultimately have to deal with the issue of
"out-of-area" Bundeswehr missions. Germany can no longer afford to be an exception to
the rule of international participation. "The Persian Gulf War was," as Hondrich put it,
"the first war after World War II where the insistence of one's own peaceableness and
nonparticipation ran counter to the German economic and security interests — and
especially to Israel's security interests ~ and, given these interests, was even bound to be
considered untruthful." 110
It is a fact that the Federal Republic of Germany, in becoming a member of the
United Nations in 1973, accepted, without reservation, all the rights and obligations
associated with UN membership. This provides the general basis for Bundeswehr
participation in UN peace-keeping and peace enforcement operations. 111 The example of
the Persian Gulf War also demonstrates that in the face of today's intertwining of
international politics at an all-encompassing global level, it is no longer possible for
Germany to limit its security efforts to the regional level. When President Bush talked of
"partners in leadership," he also implied that Germany should contribute to protecting
international law and implementing democracy and the rule of law as part of the effort to
109 See Moodie, M., "Burden-Sharing in NATO: A New Debate with an Old Label," in
Washington Quarterly, 12/1989, pp. 61-71.
110 Hondrich, 1992, p. 9.
See Bartke, "Internationale Verwendung der Bundeswehr im Rahmen der Charta der
Vereinten Nationen," in Wissenschaftliche Dienste des Deutschen Bundestages, Info-Brief 132/93,
February 1993.
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establish the principles of western democracy on a global scale. Germany did not live up
to these expectations during the Persian Gulf War, because it simply was not ready at the
time. Yet, new tests were not long in coming.
B. WHY SOMALIA AND NOT BOSNIA?
1. Operation Restore Hope
In December 1992, when the US troops went ashore near Mogadishu, they
brought along not only firepower but also the world's undivided support. Stirred by
pictures of starving children, and appalled by reports of looted warehouses and attacks on
relief organization personnel, the world hailed the decision by President Bush to start
operation "Restore Hope"." 2
At first, the plan seemed to work, because hunger was successfully battled.
Over time, however, the operation became more and more questionable. Since 4 May
1993, when the UN assumed command under the name UNOSOM II," 3 the pictures of
emaciated children have been replaced by pictures of the terrible events of 3 October
1993 and that naked corpse of a dead US soldier being dragged through Mogadishu's dust
by a raucous mob of Somali people. "What in the world are we doing?" Time magazine
asked an appalled American public and a helpless President Clinton in October 1993." 4
A detailed description of the background and a noteworthy analysis of the sequence of
subsequent events during the UN and US involvement in Somalia until the decision to withdraw the
US troops can be found in Bolton, J.R., "Wrong Turn in Somalia," in Foreign Affairs,
January/February 1994, pp. 56-66.
" 3
Ibid., p. 63.
See Time, October 18, 1993.
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The escalation of violence in Somalia indicates two things: first, from the outset,
the military operation in Somalia lacked a clear and concrete political concept accepted
by the participating nations and the UN; second, the operation started without the
personnel really knowing the country and its population. President Clinton's decision to
double the number of US troops following the disaster of 3 October 1993, while at the
same time planning to withdraw all troops by late March 1994, shows the inconsistency
of the current American approach to foreign involvement." 5 The most serious failure of
the whole operation was certainly UN resolution No. 814, through which, on 26 March
1993, the operation in Somalia took on an entirely different quality. 116 The once
humanitarian relief operation was expanded to be a "nation-building" mission, without
anyone knowing just how to go about the task of "nation building." At the same time, the
hunt for the powerful clan leader Aidid commenced, and the peace-keeping mission thus
rapidly turned into a peace enforcement mission that lacked both the appropriate
equipment and UN authorization." 7
The withdrawal of the US troops can in large part be attributed to the CNN
factor. More than any other argument in favor of a sharp reduction of the worldwide US
commitment, pictures of captured US soldiers broadcast from Somalia broadcasted into
every American living room served to demonstrate the costs associated with being the
See The New York Times, "Somali Leader Gets Mixed Signals From the US About Its Next
Steps," October 9, 1993, p. 7.
116 See Bolton, 1994, p. 62.
See Holmes, S.A., "Clinton Defends Aspin on Action Regarding Request for US Tanks," in
The New York Times, October 9, 1993, p. 7.
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world policeman, and set public opinion against expanding such a role in the future. 118
Another direct outcome of this development is the new US policy of a more restricted
participation in future UN peace-keeping operations. 119
With regard to Somalia, the withdrawal of US troops will be a signal to all other
nations to withdraw their troops as well. 120 As a result, Somalia will probably very soon
lapse back into its old anarchic structures, and everything that helped calm the situation
throughout almost the entire country will be gone within a few weeks.
When the operation started, many Europeans and even more people in the
Balkans were wondering about the commitment in Somalia. In Bosnia, where Serb
genocide quickly spread in April 1 992, US intervention using ground forces would have
had a major impact. ~ also for humanitarian reasons. If it is true that the United States in
the future will confine its commitment as a world policeman in the "new world order" to
strategically important regions, the question inevitably arises as to whether Somalia has
any strategic importance. What are the legitimate national interests that would warrant
such an operation? Are there any oil fields in that region? Does the United States need
Somalia as a "flattop" for global power projection?
As mentioned before, the United States is in a position in the post-Cold War era
to choose whether, where, and with whom to engage. The question raised at the
See Sommer, T., "Dem Sheriff wird der Stern zur Last," in DIE ZEIT, October 29, 1993, p. 1.
See Williams, D., and Devroy, A., "US Limits Peace-Keeping Role," in Washington Post,
November 25, 1993, p. A60.
See Suddeutsche Zeitung, "Deutscher Abzug im Sog der USA," October 18, 1993.
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beginning is therefore quite simple to answer: the United States went to Somalia because
it did not go to Bosnia. The reason is obvious. In contrast to assistance given to Bosnia,
assistance given to war-torn Somalia seemed to be an easy gain in prestige without taking
too great a risk.
Since 3 October 1993, Bosnia's future ~ and the future of Europe as a whole for
that matter — has been even more insecure than before. The US Congress and the general
public have never shown much interest in becoming involved in the war in the Balkans,
and, since the events in Somalia, the chances of a US engagement with ground forces in
Bosnia have plummeted to an absolute low.
The ambitious goals of the no less ambitious UN Secretary General, Boutros
Boutros-Ghali, to help troubled Somalia to get not only rice, but also a new political
structure, were directly related to the Balkans.
121 Annoyed that the Europeans had, in
Boutros-Ghali's view, passed on to the UN one of their very own problems, the Secretary
General pushed through an intervention in Somalia.
Yet a third party is also in Somalia, because it is not in Bosnia: the Federal
Republic of Germany. This illustrates that the united Germany is taking great pains to
find its role in the world and that it is still quite unsure of how to go about it.
2. The Germans on their Way to the Front
It was a long way to the first armed mission of the Bundeswehr outside the
NATO area. During the almost forty years of forward defense on domestic territory,
hardly anybody in the Bundeswehr had seriously believed until 1989 that Bundeswehr
See Lerch, C, "Wie weiter in Somalia?" in Frankfurter Allgemeine, October 12, 1993.
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forces would ever be employed for purposes other than national defense. The utmost that
was conceivable was to defend another member of the alliance in accordance with Article
5 of the North Atlantic treaty.
Given its high degree of professionalism and its outstanding equipment, the
Bundeswehr was considered one of the most effective armies, if not the most effective
,
among the European NATO members. Other nations envied Germany for its conscript
army that was every bit as combat capable as a professional army. They also showed
admiration for the Bundeswehr concept of Innere Fiihrung, or leadership and civic
education, a concept that became the backbone of the internal structure of the new West
German Armed Forces and distinguished them very clearly from the former Wehrmacht
of the Third Reich. With this new internal structure "never again could blind obedience
to orders become the alibi for crimes." 122
Both proud and respected, the Bundeswehr had demonstrated defense
preparedness side by side with the allies, thus successfully contributing to deterrence.
Here again, the Persian Gulf War brought about a change. The other NATO members
suddenly left Germany to deploy first to the Gulf region and later to the Adriatic, while
the German soldiers, made uncertain by the politicians and considered cowards, and
deserted by their allied comrades in arms — both friend and foe -- stayed at home. 123
Abenheim, D., Reforging the Iron Cross (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988), p.
293.
See Martenson, S., "Von Feind und Freund verlassen," in Deutsches Allgemeines
Sonntagsblatt, February 19, 1993.
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In the view of many observers within and without the Federal Republic, it was
high time that something was done about the credibility of Germany's foreign policy and
its ability to act. In order to prevent a singularization of Germany in NATO, which was
for more then four decades a major German concern, the UN mission in Somalia, which
carried the label "humanitarian operation," was a welcome opportunity to find a way for
Germany to act. As early as 17 December 1992, the German government offered to
provide the United Nations, in support of UNOSOM, a reinforced supply and transport
battalion of up to 1,500 (later 1,700) personnel to perform "humanitarian tasks." 124 In
particular, German soldiers were offered as personnel to set up a distribution organization
for relief goods. However, this offer was made with the understanding that the mission
would be carried out in regions "where peace had been established." The reason that this
was so important to Bonn was that it provided the only way to win wide support for the
mission among the German public and also in the Federal Parliament.
For the Bundeswehr, Bonn's decision did not come as a surprise. As early as
February 1992, the Federal Government had decided to redefine the mission of the
Bundeswehr. New risks and threats on one hand, as well as a new strategy and structure
of the NATO alliance on the other, led to new tasks for the German Armed Forces. 125 A
new mission package has been established in detail in the "Defense Policy Guidelines,"
See Hoffmann, O., Deutsche Blauhelme bei UN-Missionen (Bonn: Aktuell 1993), pp. 86-87.
See General K. Naumann, Chief of Staff of the Bundeswehr, "Wir betreten alle gemeinsam
Neuland - die Dimensionen des neuen Auftrages der Bundeswehr," in TRUPPENPRAXIS, 5/1993, p.
444.
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which reflect Germany's new role and new responsibilities in the world. 126 According to
this document, the German Armed Forces will protect Germany and its citizens against
external danger and political blackmail; it will promote military stability and the
integration of Europe and defend Germany as well as its NATO allies; and it will
contribute to world peace and international security in accordance with the Charter of the
United Nations, providing support in disaster situations and humanitarian operations.
In 1992, the force structure planning of the Bundeswehr, was carried out with
the so-called "expanded mission spectrum" in mind. The military leaders had done their
homework based on the experience gained by observing coalition operations during the
Persian Gulf campaign. 127 This was especially true of rapid deployment and logistical
support issues, in which the German military had actually been involved during the
deployment phase of Gulf operations. While the old structure of the Bundeswehr was
primarily tailored to the needs of a Forward Defense of West Germany, the future
structure of the German Armed Forces will be not limited to the exclusive defense of the
Central Region. It will also incorporate components for crisis management and
humanitarian aid operations under NATO or UN auspices.
So, while the Bundeswehr was prepared for the Federal Government's decision
of 17 December 1992, 128 the opinion-forming process with respect to Bundeswehr
See Bundesminister der Verteidigung, Verteidigungspolitische Richtlinien, November 1992.
See TAP-Dienst Sicherheitspolitik, "Die Neuplanung der Bundeswehr," 1-2/93, January
1993.
128 See Neue Ruhr Zeitung, "Die Truppe ist bereit zum UNO-Einsatz," April 17, 1993.
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out-of-area missions in general (meaning missions beyond the NATO limits), and the
mission in Somalia in particular, is still going on within the political establishment. Of
particular significance is the question of whether the Basic Law permits such missions, or
whether there is a need for amending or clarifying the constitution. The debate about this
issue is reminiscent of that on German rearmament in the fifties. As in those days, a
decision must be made on the future course of German foreign and security policies.
Germany's relations with the United States are at stake, as was the case in the years
before 1955. As it was then, it is Konrad Adenauer's party, the Christian Democratic
Union (CDU) which is the driving force behind an acceptance of the military, in full
consonance with Clausewitzian notions, 129 as an indispensable instrument of responsible
politics ~ and this applies also to out-of-area missions.
On 4 October 1990, the Federal Chancellor, Helmut Kohl, said in Berlin that
"the unified Germany will meet its increased responsibilities within the United Nations,
the European Community, and the Atlantic alliance." Continuing, he noted that it was
the intent of the Federal Government to "establish unambiguous constitutional
prerequisites soon and to clarify the constitutional bases." 130 Since there are no clarifying
comments in the Basic Law concerning the employment of German Armed Forces
outside the national German territory or in combined/joint operations with the armed
See Clausewitz, C.v., On War (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976).
130 See Deutscher Bundestag, Plenarprotokoll 12/5, Bonn, January 30, 1991, p. 69.
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forces of other countries, there is room for broad interpretation by the political parties —
as was the intent of the authors of the constitution. 131
On 20 August 1990, there was a meeting of the party leaders of the CDU,
Christian Social Union (CSU), Social Democratic Party (SPD), and the Free Democratic
Party FDP) at the Federal Chancellery. At the meeting it was agreed in principle to
amend the Basic Law. The proposals and demands of the CDU concerning international
missions of the Bundeswehr are the most far-reaching ones. The CDU wants the German
Armed Forces to become integrated into European multinational formations and to
participate in peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations on a global scale on behalf
of the United Nations. 132 This means that a clarification of the Basic Law must allow an
employment of the Bundeswehr for NATO and/or UN missions and for the defense of
joint European interests. A solution allowing only "blue helmet" (peace-keeping)
missions is seen as unacceptable on the grounds that a clarifying amendment to the Basic
Law should effect a change in Germany's international situation, rather than putting
additional restrictions in place that do not recognize current developments. 133
While the CSU is pursuing similar objectives, the FDP, as a member of the
government coalition, is calling for an amendment of the Basic Law to allow
participation in peace-keeping and peace-enforcement missions, the latter being only
131 See Bartke, 1993.
See CDU-lnfofax, Aktueller Dienst der CDU-Bundesgeschaftsstelle, Nr. 7, 1 990.
See WELT am Sonntag, "Beschrankung auf Blauhelme widerspricht dem Volkerrecht,"
March 17, 1991.
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permissible with a two-thirds majority vote of approval in the Bundestag (Federal
Parliament). 134
Finally, the SPD, the most important opposition party at the federal level, wants
to allow exclusively "blue helmet missions" by an amendment of the Basic Law, but to
exclude other military missions beyond NATO territory once and for all. 135 Although, in
terms of the Basic Law, there is a consensus that the deployment of military units for UN
missions gives no cause for concern in the areas of humanitarian aid, disarmament
measures, transportation tasks, and medical care, the UN deployment of the Bundeswehr
in Somalia prompted the SPD to file a complaint with the Federal Constitutional Court in
Karlsruhe. According to the SPD, the Somalia operation clearly constituted a violation of
the Basic Law. 136
However, the SPD's motion was dismissed. The Bundeswehr advance units,
which had already deployed to Somalia, were not ordered to return to Germany. After 23
June 1993, the Bundeswehr could start deploying its main forces. The area of operations
assigned to the Bundeswehr contingent was Belet Huen in the northern part of Somalia, a
safe region "most likely pacified like no other Somalian region." 137 In contrast to the
American allies, who right from the start of Operation "Restore Hope" suffered losses by
134 SeeBartke, 1993, p. 25.
See Kolner Stadtanzeiger, "SPD will deutsche UN-Einsatze nur bei friedenserhaltenden
Aktionen," November 19, 1993.
136 See Bundesverfassungsgericht - 2 BvQ 1 7/93 - June 23, 1 993.
See Sommer, D., "Das Eis ist gebrochen," in TRUPPENPRAXIS 5/1993, p. 458.
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the dozen in Mogadishu, there were no German casualties in Belet Huen. The German
press, which followed every move of the Bundeswehr on this first out-of-area mission
with German combat and combat support troops, had nothing to report apart from spiders,
desert sand, and the scorching weather the German "boys" had to endure until their
withdrawal in early March of 1994. 138
The Federal Government had picked Belet Huen quite deliberately. Any
mission other than a purely humanitarian one, such as providing protection or
surveillance which might involve heavy losses, would have had disastrous consequences
for domestic politics in Germany just as it was starting to take a larger role in the
international community. The structural realities of German involvement were not
rewritten as a result of Somalia, however. The Germans were spared the CNNfactor of
Mogadishu with its pictures of death and violence. In the long run, Germany will have to
confront the fact that burden-sharing will inevitably involve risk-sharing as well.
Notwithstanding the desire to participate on the international level, the Federal
Government followed the American example and called the German soldiers home. The
reason given for the German withdrawal, according to Defense Minister Volker Riihe,
was that the Germans would not be able to continue their mission without the US supply
lines.
139 Of course, one must also consider the fact that the absence of US supply lines
also meant the absence of US integration in the security arrangements for German troops.
See Frankfurter Neue Presse, "Nur der Sand und die Post machen Arger," July 28, 1993.
See Suddeutsche Zeitung, "Ruhe: Bundeswehr in Somalia von USA abhangig," November
16, 1993.
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In conclusion, it can be stated that German participation in UNOSOM II was a
success, even though the original mission of providing logistical support to an Indian
brigade could not be carried out because that force never arrived in the German area of
operations. Without the assistance of the German soldiers, it would not have been
possible to provide drinking water and to set up hospitals and schools in the devastated
region in such a short period of time. The military results of the Somalia operation are
asserted by some to be a failure, by others to be a success. While this issue may continue
to be a source of debate, one thing is certain: as a vehicle for Germany to explore the
realities of participation in out-of-area disputes, the Somalia deployment of German
forces was a success.
Politically speaking, the mission was a success because a strong commitment to
"humanitarian objectives" may help open the door to "normal" UN missions while
maintaining the positive direction of German public opinion regarding military
involvement. In view of the obvious connection between political will and public
consensus, one must doubt, at least for the time being, that constitutional clarification will
follow. As long as both politicians and the military want to completely erase the
perception that Germans will inherently seek to become involved in "military
adventures," 140 the majority of parliamentary votes required for an amendment to the
Basic Law will be forestalled. The course which the Germans are following, namely
promoting public acceptance of a new international role, assuming political responsibility
in the world, and, finally, creating a new image the Bundeswehr within the scope of
See DER SPIEGEL, "...morgen die ganze Welt," 16/1993, pp. 18-22.
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humanitarian aid missions can in the long run, however, lead to public consensus and a
reinterpretation of the Basic Law.
C. THE WAR IN THE BALKANS
1. War Returns to Europe
The road from the shots in Sarajevo in June 1914 to the siege of Sarajevo in
1992 was long. This road has seen the disasters of the 20th century and passes through
nuclear-era peace of 1945-1989. Looking down this road, one knows only that the dream
of a new world order and/or a European peace order remain unfulfilled. For forty years
the West was able to hold in check the most powerful war machine the world has ever
known. Now, the West has problems to bring even small armies and irregular units to
account.
Conventional deterrence made a comeback during the Gulf War. But what was
won in the desert was lost during the first two years of the war in the Balkans: the will
and competence to use conventional deterrence. Although deep-seeded tensions between
Serbs and Croats have long been documented, 141 the war came as a complete shock to the
European public. If anything, one expected the beginning of a new era of peace, rather
than the outbreak of such a bloody war, particularly at the end of the Cold War.
Daily pictures of the dead and wounded, flattened villages and desperate
refugees stir up feelings of terror and rage. The mortar shell attack of 5 February 1994,
See Clenny, M., The Fall of Yugoslavia (New York: Penguin Books, 1992).
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which killed 69 people in the main Sarajevo market, 142 is the latest peak in such violence.
Negotiation attempts, peace talks and cease fires-continually raised hopes that the
nightmare would soon end. But the more diplomatic efforts failed, and the longer
Serb-nationalist conquest continued, the more resignation and dejection took their toll.
The people who had become victims of Serb aggression could not believe how
the continent of Europe was abandoning them and idly standing by while the murder in
the Balkans continued. They could not figure out why the civilized world, in light of
such murder, banishment and devastation, had forgotten its moral principles.
The massive firepower of an international air-land-sea armada came to the aid of
an overrun Kuwait, but the dying victims in Bosnia had to be satisfied for almost two
years with aid in the form of food convoys. The invasion of one country by another,
especially in a region containing such .a large portion of the world's oil supply, brought
forth a provocation that the world could not accept. Furthermore, if one takes into
consideration that the aggressor was trying to build atomic weapons, a fierce response
was only a matter of time.
Bosnia, on the other hand, situated in Europe's own backyard, has initially been
met by an Atlantic world of indecisiveness, ignorance, and resurgence of individual
national interests. Bosnia was hoping for help from the sole remaining world power, but
the United States was reluctant to continue playing the role of world policeman.
M2 See The New York Times, "NATO to Hold Emergency Talks on Fighting Around Sarajevo,"
February 7, 1994, p. A7.
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2. NATO's Role in the Former Yugoslavia
"The need for NATO to assert its continued relevance in the absence of a 'clear
and present danger' to the East, provided part of the background for the decision to
expand its activities into the unchartered territory of peacekeeping." 143
Nevertheless, up until the summer of 1992, NATO had more or less stayed out
of the Balkan War (except for a few warships and planes to enforce the embargo).
NATO's reluctance to become involved was attributable in part to the United States'
attitude toward the Balkans. "On May 18, [1993], Mr. Christopher told the House
Foreign Affairs Committee, 'At heart, this is a European problem.'" 144 The war in the
former Yugoslavia, Mr. Warren Christopher has also explained, involves only the
"humanitarian concerns" of the United States, not its strategic interests. 145
Further, NATO was somewhat hesitant to get involved because the European
NATO partners could not come up with a common goal in their policy toward the
Balkans. Gillessen, one of the leading security policy editors in Germany, appropriately
points out how far removed from reality NATO members' now routine differentiation of
effectiveness of "in" and "out" of area was. 146 According to him, this perception of
See Berdal, M., "Peacekeeping in Europe," in International Institute for Strategic Studies
(ed.), European Security After The Cold War, The IISS 35th Annual Conference, Brussels, September
9-12, 1993, p. 15.
The New York Times, "Backing Away Again, Christopher Says Bosnia Is Not a Vital Interest,"
June 4, 1993.
See Tucker, R.W., and Hendrickson, D.C., "America and Bosnia," in The National Interest,
Fall 1993, p.23.
See Gillessen, C, "Versaumte Abschreckung," in Frankfurter Allgemeine, April 28, 1993.
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differentiation has become so widespread in the Alliance because different European
countries, especially Germany and France, wanted to set limits to the Alliance's solidarity
and deterrence principles. In the case of Alliance solidarity, France did not want to
become a normal NATO member. This explains why France in the beginning of the war
absolutely rejected military action in Bosnia under the auspices of NATO; only under the
supreme command of the United Nations was military action acceptable to France. In the
case of the principle of deterrence, there was a general German desire for protection, but
Germany did not want to be a protector. That is why, according to Gillessen, Germany
"came up with so many constitutional restrictions." 147 Great Britain feels, as does
Howard, that British interests lie beyond Europe. 148 This is why the British feel that it is
important that the realization of European interests do not hamper their ability to pursue a
more wide-ranging foreign policy. Nineteenth and twentieth century European history
has clearly shown that British interests have rivaled whatever the strongest European
nation happened to be (balance of power). As far as the British are concerned, would not
a Greater Serbia play a welcome role in the European power structure?
The makers of strategy in Serbia and the Serbian dominated parts of Bosnia
were aware of this fundamental problem of NATO from the start. Because they did not
fear NATO, they continued with their crusade for domination and basically ignored
everything the security institutions had to say. 149
Ibid.
148 See Howard, M., 1 972, pp. 31-52.
149 See Europaische Sicherheit "Die NATO und der Balkan," 7/1 993, p. 326.
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Finally, in February 1994, after the events on the market place in Sarajevo and
the starting effect of the CNN-factor on public opinion both within and without the
United States, NATO made a decisive step in order to regain the power of deterrence in
Europe. Under the threat of NATO air strikes, Serbian artillery around Sarajevo was
being moved elsewhere. Thanks to NATO's belated determination to intervene, the war
in the Balkans has hopefully come to the beginning of its end.
The application of collective power found its clearest demonstration on February
28, 1994, when US fighter jets shot down four ground-attack jets flown by Bosnian
Serbs. This was a milestone for the 45-year-old Alliance, because NATO has never
before engaged in combat. 150
As was the case during the Gulf War, in the Balkans the Germans were the cause
of unrest in NATO: once again Bonn refused to participate in NATO or UN sponsored
military actions because of constitutional restrictions and the risk of singularization.
"The Americans are running out of patience with the Germans" 151 dominated German
headlines in February 1993. The reason for increasing American impatience with
Alliance partner Germany was the alarming news that Geilenkirchen-based German
soldiers in AWACS (airborne warning and control system aircraft) were under orders to
abandon their airplanes, should the no-flight zone over Bosnia-Herzegovia have to be
See Washington Post, "US Jets Down 4 Serb Bombers Over Bosnia," March 1 , 1 994, p. A1
DIE WELT, "Ende der Geduld," February 19, 1993.
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enforced. 152 Had the German members of the crew abandoned their machines, the entire
mission would have probably resulted in failure. 153
The situation became serious for Bonn on April 2, 1993, when the NATO
Council voted to enforce UN Resolution 8 1 6 (flight ban, enforceable by military means)
with NATO air power if necessary. 154 As a result of this decision, AWACS surveillance
aircraft, along with German crew members, indirectly took part in military maneuvers to
insure that airspace was not violated. This took place outside ofNATO territory.
Because of concern that German-American relations would further deteriorate,
Bonn ruled (with CDU/CSU ministers' votes) to allow German personnel on board the
aircraft. Bonn did this despite unclarified constitutional restrictions. The SPD
considered this action, as was the case later with intervention in Somalia, to be a violation
of German Basic Law. This is why the SPD, together with the FDP, strove for
constitutional consistency and clarification in the form of a reversal of the ruling. 155
On April 8, 1993, the Federal Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht)
rejected the grievances of the SPD and FDP. 156 The Court's reasoning was not that their
grievances were necessarily inadmissible, but rather because a German withdrawal from
152
Ibid.
,53 See Bonner Rundschau, "US-Politker sehen Bonner Koalition Liber Awacs stolpern,"
February 19, 1993.
154 See Bundesverfassungsgericht - 2 BvE 5/93 - April 8, 1993.
See Frankfurter Allgemeine, "Der Zweite Senat des Verfassungsgerichts bemuht sich um den
Awacs-Konflikt in der Koalition," April 6,1993.
156 See Bundesverfassungsgericht, April 8, 1993.
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AWACS forces might have had repercussions on Germany's foreign policy. 157 The
Federal Constitutional Court was seeking to reduce mistrust toward Germany brought on
by (what the Americans and others considered to be) Bonn's unbearable constitutional
debate. But the world is not rid of this problem yet. Final constitutional clarification
concerning Bundeswehr out-of-area deployment, including amendment of the Basic Law
if necessary, requires a 2/3 majority vote in the Bundestag (Lower House); nobody
expects this to happen in the near future.
As became evident in the case of Somalia (Operation Restore Hope), Germany
will finally start to fulfill its global responsibilities, but first on the basis of case by case
rulings. Burden-sharing and sharing the responsibility thus remain an important faultline
in the structure of the transatlantic partnership. In light of America's partially ambiguous
interest in Europe, the significance of these realities in German-American security
relations is likely to grow.
The world officially conceded understanding for the fact that Germany could not
become actively involved in the Balkans for historic reasons. But the Americans, as well
as others, cannot understand why the Germans are "once again shirking responsibility."
There is a perception in the American public that Germany has much more to loose in the
former Yugoslavia than any other European country, especially because of the streams of
refugees from this region that want to live in Europe's richest country. How can a US
President explain to American citizens that US ground troops have to risk their lives for
See Hefty, G.P., "Bonner Glaubwurdigkeit - aus Karlsruhe," in Frankfurter Allgemeine, April
10, 1993.
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people in Bosnia while Alliance partner Germany stays home, despite the fact that
Germany has so much more at stake?
3. The American "Lift and Strike" Concept
One can no longer count on diplomacy alone in Bosnia. Since the Balkan War
began in 1991, diplomacy has failed time and again. UN and EU negotiator Cyrus Vance
(today Torwald Stoltenberg), and Lord Owen have lowered their goals by about as much
as the Serbs have raised theirs. 158 Diplomacy without a sword is worth nothing; this is the
sobering lesson of this war.
The Gulf War was a classic example of what conditions must be fulfilled in
order for the United States to intervene militarily in the "New World Order." Yugoslavia
is an example of an obvious lack of conditions for intervention, especially with ground
troops. As far as the Americans are concerned, certainly moral interests, not strategic or
economic, are at stake in the Balkans. 159 The conflict appeared to remain within the
boundaries of the actual battlefield. Nobody ~ in Europe, in the UN or the American
public — has ever really expressed real support for full scale military intervention.
According to American Secretary of State Warren Christopher, "... that is why the
President, I think, has taken a prudent policy of not over-extending United States'
commitment." 160
Sommer, T., "Bomben gegen Gewissensbisse?" in DIE ZEIT, August 20, 1993, p.1
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159 See Tucker and Hendrickson, 1993, p. 23.
The New York Times, "Backing Away Again, Christopher says Bosnia Is Not a Vital Interest,"
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Thus, troop deployment and a ground offensive, as were needed to liberate
Kuwait, were unlikely. But the United States turned to an already well-known means; it
offered air strikes, the "American way of war." 16 ' However, consistent with American
strategic thought, "air strikes" had already been carried out to bring forth the complete
opposite effect: "American C-130 planes dropping supplies." 162 How could real air
strikes open Serb containment around Sarajevo and at the same time prevent endangering
the mostly British and French UNPROFOR troops in Bosnia? Until the events of 5
February 1994 Paris and London did not go for such plans. 163 Whether they were just
worried about the safety of their own troops remains unclear; the fact remains that the US
could not convince them of the need for action, especially the British government, until
69 people were killed at one time.
The American concept for ending the Balkan War involved another component:
lifting the arms embargo on Bosnia. Once again the British and French thought that their
"Blue Helmets" would be endangered as a result of anticipated increased fighting. As far
as the Germans were concerned, Bonn from the beginning of the conflict had made it
clear that the Bundeswehr could not participate in air strikes or ground attacks because of
constitutional restrictions.
164
But Bonn, in solidarity with the US, supported lifting the
Sommer, T., August 20, 1993.
The New York Times, "Europeans Welcoming US Help in the Balkans," February 25, 1993.
See Frankfurter Allgemeine, "Die NATO erwagt Luftangriffe," May 7, 1993.
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arms embargo on Bosnia. 165 By doing this the Germans hoped to make amends after the
damage the AWACS debate had caused.
After an American President, who was undecided and unsure toward the former
Yugoslavia, had unsuccessfully sent his secretary of state to Europe to win the support of
European allies for his "lift and strike" concept, 166 Bill Clinton asked the German
Chancellor in writing to promote his plans. 167 Kohl did as he was asked. At an EC heads
of state conference in Copenhagen in Spring 1 994 he promoted Clinton's embargo policy.
This promptly upset his colleagues. As Kohl stood out in the rain, Washington did
something to make him become even more wet. Washington played down the whole
affair and said that it was not meant to be as such.
Clinton's letter to Kohl appears to not only be further evidence of America's
present attitude of part wait-and-see, part resignation... It was an ambiguous letter
that is much more a sign of questionable diplomatic expertise and lack of political
orientation. Further, it serves to cloud fundamentally stable American-German
relations which had been strained the preceding week by Christopher's implied
accusation that Bonn's early recognition of Croatia and Slovenia had led to
escalation of the war. 168
Bombarding Serb artillery positions (as a result of the ultimatum in February
1 994), destroying Serb reinforcements, and even attacking strategic targets in Serbia itself
See Bonner Rundschau, "Kohl und Ruhe: Waffen nach Bosnien liefern," February 1, 1993.
See The New York Times, "How European Unity Over Bosnia Eluded Clinton," May 12,
1993.
See Frankfurter Allgemeine, "Clintons Brief an Kohl zum Balkankrieg stiftet neue




would eventually end the war in the Balkans. However, one must remember that even the
Gulf War, after 100,000 air attacks, ended only after ground troops were deployed. 169 But
undoing Serb war success "Desert Storm style" will not be possible. To do that a massive
number of ground troops, as in Desert Storm, would be needed. These troops would then
have to spend years in the ravines of the Balkans, fighting a murderous war against the
Serbs. The examples of WWI and WWII clearly demonstrate how difficult military
action in this region can be. 170 Nevertheless, no matter what American-led NATO air
strikes on Serb targets could regain, deterrence could be probably reestablished. The next
task will be to make it clear to the US that the situation in what was Yugoslavia is among
the factors to be considered in determining its national interests.
The great interest at stake in Bosnia is neither more or less than order and
stability in post-Cold War Europe. If a persuasive case cannot be made on these
grounds, it probably cannot be made at all. 171
As one sees in southeastern Europe, post-communism creates nationalism,
which often leads to war. The former Yugoslavia is the best example for this. Slobodan
Milosevic's road to a Greater Serbia could serve as a prime model for Russia's
ultranationalist Vladimir V. Zhirinovsky or his successor on how to create a Greater
Russia.
172 The threat of rising Russian nationalism could start war in East Central
See Joffe, J., "Der Frieden lark sich nicht herbeibomben," in Suddeutsche Zeitung, April 30,
1993.
See Cancian, M.F., "The Wehrmacht in Yugoslavia: Lessons of the Past?" in Parameters,
Autumn 1993, pp. 76-81.
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85
Europe, where the former Soviet satellites and republics are facing a similar power
vacuum ifNATO is not able to provide security and stability in the region.
There is another analogy: a power vacuum in Europe which is not filled by
NATO will be filled by Russia.
But nature and politics abhor a vacuum and the NATO allies may have
allowed the vacuum to last too long. In Russia's December election, foreign policy
hard-liners were a big winners. Russia is beginning to assert itself once more. It is
finding that it no longer must plead with NATO to respect its weakness. Given the
division and lack of direction in NATO, Russia finds it can wheel and deal once
more, taking advantage of its operational freedom.
173
The deployment of about 800 Russian troops in Bosnia in mid-February 1994
was in deed a "brilliant decision," as Vitaly Churkin, the Russian Deputy Foreign
Minister, pointed out. 174 Russia has not only started to fill the power vacuum in the
Balkans, it has also guaranteed by doing so the territorial gains of the Bosnian Serbs.
The fact is that NATO's ability to function continues to lie with the United
States' presence in Europe. The war in the former Yugoslavia proves this in a dramatic
way. Despite the steps taken in February 1994, American hesitance in the former
Yugoslavia indicates a lessened interest in crisis-laden Europe. One forgets that it was
the US presence in Europe that brought that continent a half century of peace.
172 See The New York Times, "Nationalist Vote Toughens Russian Foreign Policy," January 25,
1994.
See Wall Street Journal, "Score One for Russia at Sarajevo," February 22, 1994.
174 See The New York Times, "Russia' s Balkan Card," February 1 8, 1 994.
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But why is it America's business? If the Europeans have failed to meet the
challenge, why look to us? The answer is that this country is the only superpower.
And the world will not move unless and until our President does. 175
Unfortunately, Anthony Lewis is right about this. The war in the former
Yugoslavia is the best example.
D. CONCLUSIONS
The war in the Balkans and the Persian Gulf War clearly indicate, in their own
respective ways, that the United States must continue to lead world efforts aimed at
peace. The Gulf War is an example of a clear American leadership role from which the
Europeans can benefit for their own security purposes. The war in Yugoslavia is an
example of what can happen in the absence of such leadership. Both cases underline
Joseph S. Nye's "bound to lead" 176 as a response to Paul Kennedy's Decline Thesis.
Further, the present crisis in the Balkans demonstrates that Europe will continue to rely
on security and political ties with the US, despite efforts to create common foreign and
security policies within the European Union.
These case studies also show that, since the end of the Cold War, each international
crisis does not ~ or does not appear — to involve the United States' interests. America's
relative dependence on established military alliances has also dwindled since the
East-West confrontation was nullified.
Lewis, A., "Waiting for Clinton," The New York Times, April 19, 1993.
See Nye, J.S., Bound to Lead. The Changing Nature of American Power (New York: Basic
Books, 1990).
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The international community is not an involvement that can be neglected for very
long. The absence of American leadership in the former Yugoslavia may very well cause
problems in the years to come. This is the case because the example Vladimir V.
Zhirinovsky takes from Bosnia is that the Americans will act more with rhetoric than
with force unless their direct security interests are concerned. The Zhirinovskys will
misjudge NATO and the Western World, and when they misjudge them, this may
provoke a war. If that happens it is much more the fault ofNATO than those who would
misjudge its reactions. In Bosnia the United States and its allies left their standards
behind them, but the world will judge NATO by those standards. They will judge NATO
by those standards in Ukraine, they will judge the Alliance by those standards in the
Baltics and in Kazakhstan. There is a power vacuum in Europe. No power vacuum is
ever absolute, but the very fact that it exists may in some sense provoke aggressive
attitudes.
Nevertheless, the structural foundations of German-American security relations
have remained unchanged in the New World Order. In some areas, these foundations
have become even more significant. History suggests that democracies — especially
American democracy — shift in their collective attitudes and beliefs. The person in
Germany who believes that America's relationship to Europe is in German interests has to
be concerned about America losing its trust in Germany. This is dependent on the
Germans fully accepting foreign policy responsibilities of burden-sharing when issues go
beyond mere German interests. The old borders of the Alliance were justified for
88
maintaining stability in the bipolar world order of the Cold War: in the New World
Disorder, these borders are simply relics from a time long past.
The most serious future controversies between Germany and America will deal
with how much responsibility Germany will be willing to accept in the world ~ be it in
free world trade or in collective security outside traditional NATO boundaries. This
renders unacceptable the German attitude of not being able to deploy German soldiers to
help out in humanitarian missions outside of Germany or well-defined NATO borders
because of constitutional restrictions. This assertion becomes all the more true in light of
the negative turn of events in Somalia and its effects on American domestic policy.
As one sees in Somalia and Bosnia, guerrilla forces, terrorists, and bandits involved
in violent confrontations embrace a new type of military action. This is characterized by
tribal, ethnic, and religious factions engaged in partisan warfare without using high-tech
weapons and respecting the traditional conventions of war. 177
Counter-guerrilla warfare remains politics by other means. Armed action — even in
low-intensity conflict — must therefore correspond to political objectives. 178 As
demonstrated in the case of Somalia, unclear political goals lead to questionable and
unclear military goals, which inevitably lead to a higher casualty rates. The unsuccessful
hunt for Somali clan leader Aidid is an excellent example of this.
The traditional Americans military concepts and strategies that were successful in
the Gulf War cannot solve low-intensity conflicts as seen in Somalia and Bosnia. "The
See Snow, 1993, pp. 64-84.
Ibid.
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Mystique of US Air Power," as described by Cohen in light of the Gulf War, means little
in guerrilla warfare.
179
Firepower and military technology can never be a substitute for careful and flexible
political thinking and military planning. This was true in the past and will especially hold
true in future regional and/or low intensity conflicts. "The American Way of War" has
proven to be a cornerstone of deterrence and played a tremendous role in winning the
Cold War, when deterrence has failed, however, and it is necessary to use military force
to deal with conflict, especially low intensity conflict, the need for a reexamination of US
operational thinking becomes apparent.
Deterrence in order to avoid fighting was a principal of NATO security policy in
the Cold War-era. The cases of Kuwait and Bosnia clearly demonstrate the
appropriateness of such an approach, even in the New World Order. In the past, the
followers of the German and American freedom movement (Friedensbewegung) had
always wanted to overcome deterrence. Today, even a token peace would undoubtedly
be a priceless commodity in the Balkans. How wonderful it would be if a country like
Bosnia had been spared such misery and despair because Serb leader Milosevic been
confronted with the principal of deterrence from the beginning. The Cuban Missile Crisis
(1962) is a clear example of how to end a crisis with a strong deterrent will and
capability. Other examples demonstrate what happens when deterrence is not used. The
Falklands War (1982) would not have been necessary had British troops shown the flag.
See Cohen, E.A., "The Mystique of US Air Power," in Foreign Affairs, January/February 1994,
pp. 109-124.
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A British infantry battalion and a Royal Navy frigate would have been enough to do the
job. The same is true for Kuwait. Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm
(1990-1991) would have been unnecessary had limits of the tolerable been clearly
demonstrated to the dictator in time.
The eve of World War II presents the worst case of neglected deterrence. A lack of
deterrent will and capability, as well as the lack of security guarantees from powerful
nations, made the attack on Poland possible. This is an historic lesson, which becomes
all the more significant in light of the current debate on NATO's potential expansion to
the East and rising ultranationalism in Russia.
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IV. THE FUTURE OF GERMAN-AMERICAN SECURITY RELATIONS AND
NATO
The external security position of Germany has improved after the end of the Cold
War in fully unexpected ways. The immediate threat by a hostile Eastern world power no
longer exists. A united Germany remains allied to its Western neighbors. It is today
"encircled by friends," but those who would therefore conclude that Germany no longer
needs collective security and defense, should reflect on the imponderables in East Central
Europe as well as on the southern flank of Europe.
Germany continues to depend on ties to the nuclear and naval forces of the North
Atlantic Alliance as stated in the German Defense Policy Guidelines
(Verteidigungspolitische Richtlinien) of November 1992, because Germany remains a
"non-nuclear power and continental middle-power with world-wide interests." 180 The
reliability of the allies and the reliability of the Germans as partners are the guarantors of
Germany's security. Any attempt to change this state-of-affairs, to base national assertion
more on national means, would not only be futile, it would lead directly to isolation and
coalitions against Germany.
It is also evident that NATO, as an organization founded in the era of the Cold War,
must be adapted to the new security environment and probably redefine its general
mission as well as its roles and functions in order to overcome its present crisis. The
Bundesminister der Verteidigung, Verteidigungspolitische Richtlinien, November 1992, p.
4.
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disaster in the Balkans makes it crystal clear that no international organization can
function without the political will and the consensus of its member states. This is also
true for NATO. The war in the Balkans has proven traumatic for the Atlantic Alliance, as
it points out how quickly the security consensus its members once shared dissipated after
the Cold War had ended. The current situation of the Alliance is rather fittingly
described in NATO circles with an analogy. A huge dragon has been slain, but now one
lives in a jungle with an alarming number of poisonous snakes. In many ways it was
easier to keep an eye on the dragon. With respect to NATO, this implies it is very
unlikely that all sixteen member states would be prepared to participate in joint defensive
measures against each poisonous snake in like manner and at the same time.
Thus the central question arises: Is the Alliance still necessary without the former
threat and what is it still capable of doing? With so many poisonous snakes lurking
around in the adjacent regions, the European members at least have kept their doubts
about the Alliance within limits. Is it not surprising that under these circumstances the
East Central European countries of the former Warsaw Pact want to become new
members ofNATO?
However, nations on both sides of the Atlantic are part of NATO. Traditional
isolationists in the United States are not the only ones to register their doubts about
NATO still being needed by their country. This last chapter seeks to analyze the future
necessity for the Atlantic Alliance and the ongoing partnership with the US not only for
Germany but for the security of Europe as a whole.
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A. EAST CENTRAL EUROPE'S SEARCH FOR SECURITY
1. The Rebirth of Imperial Temptations
Europe is moving backward in history, as if in H.G. Wells' time machine. The
atrocities of a past which were believed overcome long ago overshadow Europe's present
and darkens the future of this continent. According to the 3 January 1994 issue of the
news magazine DER SPIEGEL, fascism is threatening to reemerge from the ashes of
history, with 1993 being its "most successful year." 181
The power vacuum created by the collapse of the Soviet Empire and the Western
orientation crisis with respect to East Central Europe and elsewhere is compensated by
ideologies of hatred. The development of post-communist nationalism and, in part, a
relapse into tribalism, is the revenge of peoples whose identities have long been
suppressed in the bipolar world of power blocs. 182 Fueled by unsolved ethnic-political
conflicts,
183 poverty and national humiliation, desperation and anger, aggressiveness is
bottling up and unleashed in the form of xenophobia, suppression of minorities, threats
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While such potentials for conflict were initially regarded as regional problems,
they are now viewed in a different light as a result of Vladimir V. Zhirinovsky's shocking
success in the Russian parliamentary elections held in December 1993. 184 National
degradation, fear of unemployment and crime, disappointment with Boris Yeltsin's
reform policy, inflation and impoverishment have driven approximately one quarter of
the Russian voters into the arms of the only candidate who overtly vows to lead Russia
into an era of new grandeur. 185 "As the elections showed, nostalgia for the old empire is a
potent issue in Russia these days, with many Russians disillusioned by what they see as a
string of unfulfilled promises from the West." 186
Zhirinovsky is a real expert when it comes to exploiting public fear of poverty
and the fear of the entire Russian people of bankruptcy and humiliation of the nation for
his politics. The essence of his political approach is: "Bayonets for bank notes;
expansion against inflation, geostrategy rather than economics; racism rather than
reformism." 187 Zhirinovsky's followers can be found especially in the Russian military
community. On December 12th, the soldiers, certainly hardest-hit by the collapse of the
Soviet Empire, voted for him at a rate far above the national average. 188
See for example, The New York Times, "Treacherous Transition," December 20, 1993, p.
A15.
185 See Schmidt-Hauer, C, "Sein Kampf," in DIE ZEIT, January 21 , 1994,
pp. 7-8.






No demographic study has yet been published that maps out his followers. But
interviews and samplings showed strong support among soldiers and sailors, disaffected
youth, pensioners, workers in military industry ~ those, who, like the young Zhirinovsky,
felt rejected, abused, humiliated and impotent as their country tumbled from great power
to economic cripple.' 89
The Russian neo-fascist Zhirinovsky has not yet seized a foreign country as
announced in his book "The Last Jump Towards the South" 190 ; however, he is already
playing an important part in Russian foreign policy. The "Zhirinovsky Factor" has, in the
meantime, become Boris Yeltsin's most efficient instrument for urging Western support
for his reform policy. In addition, he provides Yeltsin and his foreign minister Andrei V.
Kozyrev with arguments for a warning to Western Europe and the United States not to
take any action that conflicts with Russian interests; this applies particularly to an
eastward expansion of NATO. Any such step, Moscow argues, would only support the
cause of Zhirinovsky and the ultra-nationalists and further add to their strength. In the
meantime, however, the "Zhirinovsky Factor" is also used for countering Western
criticism aimed at Russia's increasingly aggressive attitude toward its neighbors in the
"near abroad".
19 '
While the Western world is keeping a close watch on the course of Russia's
reform policy, ready to provide trillions of dollars in economic aid, Moscow is
The New York Times, "Muscovite with Bravado," December 14, 1993, p A1
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developing a new foreign policy strategy which continues to feature hegemony over the
former Soviet Union and, to a lesser degree, over East Central Europe. 192 Russia is
regaining the former Soviet sphere of domination as its sphere of influence. However,
rather than using military force, as has been done in the past, geopolitical tactics
involving far less political and economic efforts are now being applied.
In the current international political climate, the former Soviet republics and
East Central Europe are being drawn into Moscow's orbit because of Russia's political
weight in the region and the unwillingness or inability of states and groups of states
outside the region to counter the Russian Federation. Such a situation grants Moscow all
of the benefits and none of the responsibilities typically associated with a hegemonic
status. Indeed, a case could be made that Russia enjoys, in some significant ways, a more
advantageous geopolitical position now than the Soviet Union did at the height of its
domination of Eastern Europe. 193
The power vacuum in East Central Europe, which results from the collapse of
the Soviet Union, is being compensated for by a Greater Russian foreign policy which
vigorously opposes any eastward expansion of NATO and. in this respect, even enjoys
international support as a stabilizing factor in this region. Russia's opposition to a NATO
membership of East Central European states can be traced to Moscow's belief that this
area is vital to Russia's interests and properly belongs in its sphere of influence.
194
192 See Crow, S., "Russia Asserts its Strategic Agenda," in RFE/RL RESEARCH REPORT, Vol. 2,




According to Foreign Minister Kozyrev, Russia plays a "special role" in what
was the former Soviet Union. "To ignore that role", he said in a recent speech, "is to
ignore historic ties, what has been achieved over centuries and special relations in this
space sealed by the common history and culture of the multimillion Russian-speaking
population." 195
Russia's new military doctrine, by stating "that the security interests of the
Russian Federation and other members of the CIS may make it necessary to station
Russian troops outside Russia's borders" 196
,
provides another serious indication as to
Moscow's view on the sovereignty of Russia's neighbors. Moscow continues to regard
the former Soviet republics as subordinates and not as equals.
2. The Struggle for NATO Membership
In East Central Europe, as in the former Soviet Union, history has taught
Russia's neighboring countries to be cautious. Recent events, like Vladimir V.
Zhirinovsky's success in the parliamentary elections and the resignation of top economic
reformers in the Russian Cabinet, have alarmed the whole region.
Among the former Soviet republics, it is, besides Ukraine, the Baltic states
which are most concerned about their freshly gained independence. Thus, it is no
surprise that Lithuania was the first of the former Soviet republics to officially apply for
See Crow, S., "Russian Views on an Eastward Expansion of NATO," in Radio Liberty
Research Bulletin, Vol. 2, No. 41, October 15, 1993, pp. 21 - 24.
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Jane's Intelligence Review, "Russia's New Military Doctrine," Pointer, No. 2, December
1993, p. 1.
98
NATO membership. There is no immediate threat to Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, but
the presence of about 12,000 to 17,000 Russian troops in Latvia alone, 197 a population of
more than 1.7 million ethnic Russians, and declining economies in the Baltics are
identifiable as potential trouble spots, and will influence European security in the years to
come.
198
Latvia, Estonia, and Lithuania understandably view the presence of Russian
troops in their countries as an affront to their sovereignty. While the last Russian troops
left Lithuania on 31 August 1993, protracted talks over troop withdrawal in Latvia have
met with limited success.'
99
As far as these troops are concerned, the United States is trying to broker an
agreement between both nations under which Russia will withdraw its remaining troops
by the end of August, 1 994, in exchange for a four-year extension of Russian civilian
control of its early-warning installation near Skundra. 200
Russia's Foreign Minister Kozyrev "reportedly told a meeting of Russian
ambassadors to the former Soviet states that it would be dangerous for Russian troops to
withdraw completely from the area of the former Soviet Union, because 'unfriendly
See The New York Times, "US Tells A Visiting Latvian Official That Russia Is Moving to
Withdraw its Troops," February 1, 1994, p. A4.
See Trapans, J. A. (ed), Baltic Security: Conference in Salzburg," in RFE/RL REPORT, Vol. 1,
No. 49, December 1 1 , 1 992.
See Jackson, W. D., "Russia after the Crisis. Imperial Temptations: Ethnics Abroad," in Orbis,
Winter 1994, pp. 9-12.
200 The New York Times, February 1 , 1 994.
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forces' might move in to fill the vacuum." 201 With "unfriendly forces" Kozyrev refers to
nobody else but NATO. From the Russian viewpoint, East Central Europe is out of
bounds to the Alliance. Hence, it is no wonder that Vitaly Churkin accuses the Baltic
states of seeking confrontation with Russia while warning them "that they could defend
their interests only by cooperating with Moscow." 202
Russian military and political hard-liners are also reluctant to evacuate key bases
and exchange the strategically valuable Baltic Sea border for the much less easily
defended land frontiers it shares with the other neighboring states. '"In our case, the
danger coming from Russia is so serious, so strong that we should look for security
guarantees today', said Mr. Kahn, an economist who has been Estonia's ambassador here
[in Moscow] since Moscow recognized the independence of the Baltic countries in
1991." 20? This refers to nothing less than the protection of this region by the United
States and NATO.
To a considerable degree, the future of the Baltic republics will depend on
Ukraine's survival as a sovereign state. Unlike any other country, Russia's destiny is
linked to that of Ukraine. The inseparability of both countries is an essential element of
Russian foreign policy.
For this purpose, both the levers of economic pressure and the attempt to involve





The New York Times, January 25, 1994.
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foreign-policy actions in the world arena, are being used now and will continue to be used
in the future. At the same time, Russia will try to hinder the independent ties of Ukraine
with other countries, wherever it is possible. 204
However, it is not least by signing the "Partnership for Peace" agreement with
NATO that Ukraine decided in favor of Europe and a European security architecture. 205
Whether this opening toward Europe can be achieved, will depend to a very large degree
on the United States and Western Europe. If Ukraine is left defenseless in Russia's sphere
of influence, the essential "domino" in post-Cold War East Central Europe is in danger of
tumbling. This would have dramatic consequences for the independence of the Baltic
republics and Poland.
Among all non-Soviet republics of the former Warsaw Pact, Poland, from its
own bitter experience, knows best about existence in a power vacuum. The country is
already fearing a new Western appeasement policy which might sacrifice Poland to the
national interests of major powers. Consequently, Polish Foreign Minister Andrzej
Olechowski leaves no doubt about the fact that "Poland's participation in NATO is
synonymous with national security."206 Currently, Poland considers itself to be in a
security vacuum "between two giants", namely Germany and Russia. "The consolidation
See Levcenko, A., "The Ukraine-Russia Relations in the Field of Foreign and Security
Policies: Spheres of Cooperation and Conflicts," in Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (ed.),
Sonderforschungsvorhaben "Analysen Sicherheits-fVerteidigungspoUuk IV (SASVP IV), Ebenhausen,
1993, Band 3 B, pp. 59-65.
See The New York Times, "Ukraine Joining Plan for NATO Partnership," February 7, 1994.
p. A7.
Olechowski, A., "Polen und die Nordatlantische Allianz," in Frankfurter Rundschau, January
3, 1994.
101
of this vacuum would provoke these two countries to either regard Poland as a classic,
1 9th-century-style buffer state or as the interface of the two spheres of influence." 207
In general, the present situation, like that of the entire region, reminds one very
much of West Germany's situation at the beginning of the Cold War. Initially, with
respect to security policy, West Germany was also a conceptual "no-man's land" the
defense of which was originally not intended. West Germany's only advantage as
compared to Poland was the fact that allied forces had already been stationed on its
territory. Poland's current advantage, as compared to West Germany back in 1947/48, is
the fact that it is exposed to a diplomatic rather than a military threat. Yet, the ultimate
consequence might be the same: instability and decline instead of stability, security, and
economic development.
Haunted by the specters of the past, Prague, too, is seeking the protection of
NATO. "A rejection by the West would evoke the shadow of Munich" 208 said Pavel
Bratinka, Deputy Foreign Minister of the Czech Republic. The statement alludes to the
concessions made to Nazi Germany by Britain, Italy, and France in 1938, as a
consequence of which Czechoslovakia had to cede the "Sudetenland" to the Third Reich.
This event marked the beginning of the subsequent dismantling of Czechoslovakia.
The West is, indeed, running the risk of repeating the errors of the past, this time
in favor of Russia. Efforts to avoid any provocation of Russian ultra-nationalists must
not lead the United States and its European allies to conceding Russia special rights on
Ibid.
DER SPIEGEL, "Die Knute zeigen", January 10, 1994, p. 108.
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the territory of the former Soviet Union, thus tolerating a curtailment of the sovereignty
of these states. The same applies to the former Warsaw Pact countries. If Moscow uses
the tremendous power it has maintained in an attempt to prevent certain developments
favored by the East Central European countries, this is tantamount to the assumption of a
veto right. One cannot and must not allow Russia to practice such a policy, if a new
Yalta, that is to say a repartition of the world into spheres of interest, is to be avoided.
Hence, the attitude toward Russia poses a particular problem to the West. There
will be no Russia tailored to the preferences of the West. On the one hand, everything
must be done to support Russia's projected reform policy; on the other hand, we must
point out to Russia the limits of its imperialist aspirations. This amounts to a policy
featuring a balance between cooperation and confrontation. In pursuit of its interests, the
West must seek to protect Russia from its own temptations.
B. NATO AT A TURNING POINT
NATO: "A dead knight in armor?" This was the provocatively posed question in
the German newspaper DIE WELT ("The World"). 209 One can also ask which new tasks
for NATO can forge a new bond between both sides of the Atlantic, after the old main
mission has been fulfilled?
The communiques of NATO in recent years have rather been reading like "want
ads" in a local paper. There is praise for the surely useful but limited activities in the
See Ruhl, L, "Ein toter Ritter in der Rustung?" in DIE WELT,
August 28, 1993.
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North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) with the Eastern European countries and
those of the former Soviet Union. There is the Alliance as a possible military
subcontractor of the CSCE and the UN. And the American warnings are not the only
ones to point out that the Western military organization should actively participate in
international crisis management (out-of-area), if it is to have a function at all. To quote
the influential American Senator Richard Lugar: "out of area or out of business"; either
NATO engages in international crisis management or it will have to shut down. NATO
Security General Manfred Worner, however, adamantly refuted Lugar's logic in his
speech from September 10, 1993: "The slogan 'out-of-area' or 'out-of-business' is out of
date. We are acting out-of-area and we very much are in business." 210
However, above all NATO activities hovers the specter of the Balkan situation. If
the member states of the Alliance were not able to agree on joint actions in a conflict so
regionally close, what could possibly be the chances with conflicts further away?
1. Germany and the Process of European Integration
Germany sees NATO's most important future mission as promoting stable
political conditions in East Central Europe. 2 " This ultimately means the acceptance of
the East Central European countries into membership of the Atlantic Alliance.
The journey of the East Central European countries toward democracy and
market economies must be supported and be made irreversible. For the sake of its
2,(1 See NATO Press Service, September 1 0, 1 993, p. 1
.
Ruhe, V., Minister of Defense of the Federal Republic of Germany, "Shaping Euro-Atlantic
Policies: A Grand Strategy for a New Era," in Survival, Vol. 35, No. 2 Summer 1993, pp. 135 - 136.
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security, Europe must extend the Western zone of stability as far eastward as possible.
Hence, it is Germany in particular which commits itself to advancing cooperation with
the Eastern partners.
This concept of policy entails several ideas. The less crisis-prone the East
Central European states are, the safer Western Europe will be, the more effective
unforeseen events from the great, yet unfinished Russian empire can be absorbed.
Germany and Europe need a stable political environment, this means first of all stable
neighboring countries.
In order to achieve long-term stability in East Central Europe, the following
conditions must be realized: Democratic structures and democratic institutions; sound
economic development based on a market economy: balanced ethnic interests, respect for
minorities, and guarantees of fundamental and internationally recognized human rights. 212
However, the basic requirement for a stable East Central Europe is the
elimination of the existing power vacuum. Security policy and economic policy are
intimately linked to each other. A successful security policy will create the prerequisites
for political, economic, and social advancement. Strong liberal economies are essential
to security, and good trade relations are an important characteristic of international
stability. The containment policy that was applied by the Atlantic allies to the Warsaw
Pact countries in the Cold War era has to be replaced by a policy of political and
economic cooperation and development. All this — from a German perspective ~ is only
See Kinkel, K., Foreign Minister of the Federal Republic of Germany, "Die Rolle
Deutschlands in der Weltpolitik," in Presse und Informationsamt der Bundesregierung (ed.), Bulletin,
March 3, 1993.
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possible within the framework of NATO and the European Union. A NATO expansion
toward East Central Europe is therefore a cornerstone for European security and
prosperity.
213
The concept of stability transfer is not directed at anyone in particular but
designed to benefit everyone. Stability in and for Europe is a task for the future to be
tackled by the so-called Euro-Atlantic community. This requires a lasting US
commitment to Europe and due consideration of the interests of all European countries
(including Russia).
2. Recreating the Bipolar System
The NATO leadership is in the process of realizing that the transfer of stability
to the East is currently the most important challenge of the Euro-Atlantic community
besides the war in the former Yugoslavia. NATO is trying to develop a viable concept
for meeting this strategic challenge. Parallel to this process, the key players — the United
States and Russia ~ are still trying to redefine their national positions in order to adapt to
the drastic changes in the international environment.
During his campaign, Bill Clinton, the first US president after the Cold War,
committed himself to resolving the domestic problems of his country. The shift of
priority from foreign to domestic policy was the essential element of his program. 214 In
doing so. President Clinton is tackling a difficult task. He maintains the US claim to
leadership while seeking to keep the lowest profile possible.
2,3 SeeRuhe, 1993, p. 134.
214 See Sommer, T., DIE ZEIT, October 29, 1 993.
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According to Anthony Lake, President Clinton's national security adviser, the
concept of "enlargement" is to substitute the previous concept of "containment"; instead
of countering the former expansionist Soviet foreign policy, market economy and
democracy are supposed to be extended. 215 However, it has not been specified yet how
these challenging objectives are to be achieved in practice. In fact, Washington's policy
toward the East is in sharp contrast to an enlargement policy; it leaves the countries of
East Central Europe in a state of insecurity and instability while seeking, in a "Russia
first" approach, "global partnership" with the old strategic counterpart in Moscow. 216 As
in the days of the Cold War, it is once again the nuclear arms and arms control
considerations which serve as the current guidelines for the US foreign policy with
respect to Europe. From the American point of view, this policy requires that all nuclear
weapons of the former Soviet Union be concentrated in the hands of Russia. This arises
from the fear that, in view of the uncertain future of this region, the nuclear arsenals
might fall into the wrong hands and thus turn into an immediate threat to the United
States again. Washington is ready to support Boris Yeltsin at almost any price. Already
today Moscow is conceded special rights in the "sphere of interest" claimed by Russia,
for instance, by tolerating Russian armed intervention in the other former Soviet
republics.
217
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The United States is sponsoring Russia in order to make it a "junior nuclear
super-power partner," but, in the eyes of Adrei Kozyrev, "Russia remains a superpower ~
and not only as measured by nuclear and missile strength, but by its natural resuorces,
technological skills and strategic geography." 218 Washington's policy ignores the security
interests of Ukraine, which has been forced to turn its nuclear weapons over to Russia219
and the sovereignty of which the United States is ready to sacrifice on the altar of the new
Russian-American friendship. Moreover, this policy ignores the security interests of the
other East Central European states and considers their newly gained independence a
burden rather than a blessing. This became very obvious, for instance, in the stance the
United States took during Lithuania's struggle for recognition as an independent state. 220
Thus, the American policy with respect to East Central Europe conflicts, at least
in part, with Germany's security interests and the projected advancement of European
integration. Consequently, the German Chancellor intends to seek a redefinition of the
US policy, which is currently centering around Russia, so as to increasingly take the East
Central European region into consideration. 221 From the German point of view, it is
2,8 Kozyrev, A., "Don' t Threaten Us," The New York Times, March 1 8, 1 994, p. A1 1
.
219 See The New York Times, "Accords Signed on Ukraine' s Atom Arms,
January 15, 1994.
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particularly important to avoid a new American-Russian bipolarity at the expense of the
other East Central European states. 222
3. Partnership or Membership?
When President Clinton, after one year in office, took off to Europe for the first
time to participate in the NATO summit in Brussels on January 10 and 11, 1994, he could
be assured that the majority of the American people and of Congress would not approve
any additional commitment to Europe, not after the pictures of an American soldier being
dragged through the streets of Mogadishu had been shown on television. 223 However,
since any expansion of NATO — and thus the commitment to mutual assistance ~ might
ultimately imply the employment of American soldiers for instance for the defense of
Poland or even Latvia, it would be difficult to make this plausible to a country which is
shifting priority to domestic issues.
The "Russia-firsters in charge" 224 are not unhappy about this stance, since it
provides the US president another domestic political argument for offering ~ in line with
Moscow's opposition to an eastward expansion of NATO — "partnership" rather than
"membership". For the European allies this is one more reason for concern. "Many
Europeans worry that the Administration is so determined to avoid offending the
Ibid.
See The New York Times, "Clinton Looks Homeward - Abroad, President Is Careful Not to
Promise What the Folks Back Home Won' t Support," January 1 3, 1 994, p. A1
.
224 The New York Times, January 9, 1 994.
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Russians, who oppose NATO membership for Poland, the Czech Republic and other
Eastern European nations, that it has given Moscow a virtual veto over NATO policy." 225
For Poland and the other East Central European countries, the adopted
"Partnership for Peace" agreement implies the continued existence of the power vacuum
in their region and their remaining in Russia's sphere of influence. This fact cannot even
be consoled by President Clinton's statement, according to which "it is now a question not
of whether but when and how" NATO will take them as new members. 226
The question is whether this is really the appropriate way of pointing out to
Russia the limits of its imperialist ambitions. It remains to be seen whether the new
military doctrine spells much blessing in this context. As a matter of fact, no lessons
have been learned from Bosnia yet. The North Atlantic Alliance still owes an answer as
to what it is willing to contribute to the security of the new democracies in East Central
Europe. Hence, Eastern Europe's search for security has not yet come to an end and
consequently the question as to whether NATO is actually willing and able to tackle the
future-oriented task of a stability transfer to the East remains open as well.
C. CONCLUSION
The future of post-Cold War Europe has been a source of great speculation. One
tends to draw analogies to Europe's past. In Gregory F. Treverton's "Europe's Past,
225
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Europe's Future: Finding an Analogy for Tomorrow," 227 for example, he compares
Europe's current situation with Versailles 1919 and the Interwar Period. Treverton feels
that such comparisons are merited because after the Cold War ended, just as when World
War II ended, a new political order replaced a shattered old order. He feels that 1919 also
warrants comparison because "a weakened Russia, a retreating America, and an Eastern
Europe that was both turbulent and weak, providing an opportunity for great power
involvement" 228 were noted.
Treverton's essay is so important because it reflects America's fears toward
Europe's future development. German-Russian relations in the European power structure
especially warrant attention. The old ghosts of Rapallo are still around. 229 It is fear that
Germany will once again (as in 1922) try to establish itself as the sole major power
between East and West, and possibly trying to pit them against each other. Further, it is
feared that Germany could improve its relations with Russia and at the same time loosen
its ties with the United States. 230
Treverton is right in his analogy that the vast Russian empire today, as was the case
after tsardom, finds itself in a deep domestic crisis with an uncertain way out. He is also
right in saying that the United States has reduced its presence in Europe. America's
227 See Treverton, G.F., "Europe' s Past, Europe' s Future: Finding an Analogy for Tomorrow," in
Orbis, Winter 1993, pp. 1-20.
228
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attitudes toward the war in the former Yugoslavia, toward an expansion of NATO to the
East and reduction of US troops in Europe to "about 100,000 troops there" 231 all point to
this fact.
However, a new occurrence of Rapallo, as Treverton fears, is not in sight. There is
a lot more reason to fear a new Yalta, as already pointed out. German foreign policy
toward the United States and East Central Europe refutes Treverton's argument.
Germany is aware that a strong partnership with the United States and a solid US
commitment in NATO and the European security structure are decisive requisites for
security and stability in Europe. It is on this solid basis that it must also be in US
interests to bring security and stability to the East. This is the only way lasting peace can
be guaranteed in Europe. When Germany therefore supports NATO membership for East
Central Europe, it is trying to prevent the conditions Treverton described that
characterized the interwar period.
Germany does not want a security partnership with Russia to replace its partnership
with the United States. A "Berlin-Moscow Axis" can and must not exist; but it is
possible to come to terms with a European security structure that neither excludes Russia
nor is directed against Russia. One must agree with Vaclav Havel when he said that
NATO's advancing toward Russia's borders is "not the advance of an enemy, but that of a
sphere of democracy and stability." 232 The enormous reconstruction process of this huge
Aspin, L, The Bottom-Up Review: Forces for a New Era, September 1 , 1 993.
232 Quoted from Ruhl, L, "Etappe zur NATO," in DIE WELT
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country without democratic experience or hope for quick economic recovery will be a
common challenge for Russia and all Western industrialized nations. This fact will cause
the subject of burden— sharing to receive more attention in the future. The other elements
of structural realities will continue to be important as well, just as one observed when the
Cold War ended. Partially differing political proposals and geostrategic perspectives
remain decisive in German-American relations.
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V. CONCLUSION
Security relations between the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany
have always been relations between two unequal partners, and this will be the case in the
future. Nevertheless, relations continue to be successful to this day.
The active support of the US allowed Germany to realize its most important foreign
political goals during the postwar period. At the height of the Cold War, the relationship
with the United States within the framework of NATO enabled Germany's gaining partial
sovereignty, reintroduction into the community of European nations, and the creation of
external security, which is a requisite for domestic stability. On the basis of these solid
security relations, cooperative relations with the East were realized, not to mention the
end goal of German policy: full sovereignty and German reunification.
The United States also reached its most important goal of the postwar period: the
collapse of the Soviet Union. Accordingly, the geostrategic and political factors involved
in the relationship between Germany and the US have drastically changed. Both
countries appear to need each other less in the future than they did in the past.
The latest challenges for both countries within the framework ofNATO and the UN
have demonstrated that the known structural realities in their security relations have
gained more explosive force as a result of the fact that there is no longer a common
threat. The asymmetries in these structural realities act as faultlines that run through
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transatlantic relations; they are the cause of constant tremors when the senior partner
changes the direction of policy, and the junior partner has to adjust his policy to those
changes.
A. THE NUCLEAR ISSUE
The role of nuclear weapons and American nuclear guarantees for Europe's security
(especially Germany's) have been the biggest area of conflict in German-American
security relations for over four decades. The latent, long-term crisis in this area began
with the buildup to the nuclear stalemate of the superpowers, and ended with the collapse
of the Soviet Union.
The Federal Republic, which had been thinking in terms of conventional defense
from the beginning, had worried since the beginning the American policy of nuclear
deterrence that America could not back its nuclear guarantees, which risked involvement
in a nuclear confrontation. Germany therefore closely followed all negotiations in the
area of nuclear arms control and all developments in the area of nuclear weapons
technology, particularly because Germany would have been in the center of the nuclear
battlefield. The biggest crises in German-American security relations necessarily
centered around nuclear issues.
The United States will probably remain ready to provide protection to Europe in the
framework of extended deterrence. This readiness, however, will be combined with a
policy revolving around greater independence from alliance responsibilities in Europe.
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The Europeans will not be allowed to relent in their own conventional (and nuclear)
efforts. Russia as a giant Eurasian empire remains a major nuclear power and will
continue to act as such in Europe, even in a European order based on cooperation instead
of confrontation. The appropriate response for alliance policy is to improve the firepower
and mobility (including deployment mobility) of European forces. NATO efforts to
create reaction forces that are deployable on short notice for crisis management and crisis
response is a step in the right direction. Non-nuclear Germany will have continue to lay
claim to inclusion under the American nuclear umbrella to avoid the possibility of nuclear
threat and blackmail; the other West European states (and the evolving East Central
European states) will have to do the same.
American experts predict that the nuclearization of German forces will come to
pass.
2" This must not and will not happen. Not only would this endanger America's link
to Europe's security, and therefore German-American security relations, but it would also
serve to justify the already resurgent idea that a powerful Germany means risking German
aggression. Regardless of the accuracy of such perceptions of German intentions, the
inevitable result would be Germany's isolation in Europe.
Meanwhile, American foreign policy in the post-Cold War era continues to be
defined by the presence of nuclear weapons. New conflicts and crises occur because
Washington, in following its "Russia first" approach, accepts the fact that the newly
independent states in Eastern Europe remain in the Russian sphere of influence. The US
is doing this to assure that strategic partner Russia is the only nuclear counterpart which
See for example, Treverton, 1 993, p. 11
.
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must be dealt with in this region of the world. A firm and decisive American foreign
policy is still necessary, however; a policy that would respect and support the will and
national interests of East Central European states and clearly demonstrate to the Russian
side that there are clear boundaries to realizing the Russian imperialist vision.
Deterrence in the nuclear age was in American hands. The new deterrence will not
be controlled by the Americans alone because they are now putting more emphasis on
their own domestic policy. Europe is being tested, mainly outside old NATO borders, as
a result of the failure of current policies to provide a deterrent to aggression. Clear goals
and a solid political will stood behind deterrence as practiced in the Cold War.
Deterrence in the present era will not be possible as long as there is an absence of such
clear goals and a solid political will.
B. THE GEOPOLITICAL PERSPECTIVE
America today enjoys a significantly greater freedom of action in the world than it
did when confronting the Soviet Union in the context of every international issue. The
almost complete elimination of a ballistic missile-based nuclear threat for the "island of
America" and the end of the East-West confrontation have made this possible. During
the Cold War, America was obliged to maintain a military presence to the east and west
of the American continent. This continually led to conflicts with the allies within
regional NATO, who considered every American military deployment in the Pacific
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sphere as a compromise to their own security. The same was true when the Americans
would demand support from the West Europeans when deploying outside of Europe.
Today's need for global power projection is not what it was in the past. The current
examples of the Gulf War, Somalia, and Bosnia demonstrate under what post-Cold War
era circumstances American troops will be sent overseas. These examples also
demonstrate that future challenges for transatlantic partnership will take place outside old
NATO boundaries. Formerly clearly defined limits of regional and global perspectives,
as well as the limits of the alliance, thus become ambiguous. For the United States this
means that in the future it is likely to become involved in a regional crisis. For Germany
it means that the Germans can no longer think only in terms of security guarantees for its
NATO allies. Thus the most difficult future structural problem in German-American
security relations will revolve around the share of responsibility for collective security
outside its own regional interests that Germany will be willing to accept. The share of
responsibility that Germany will be able to cope with will determine whether
German-American security relations have a positive future.
C. THE ROLE OF DOMESTIC POLITICS
One cannot assume that a power on the other side of the Atlantic from Europe,
5000 kilometers away, would feel obligated to take on defense duties which have as their
objective the preservation of Western Europe. The mother in Chicago must constantly be
told why it is necessary that her son is defending the "Fulda Gap." The person in
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Germany that believes that Germany has an irrefutable right to US protection must be
reminded of the domestic political problems the US has experienced in relation to
overseas involvement, even at the height of the Cold War, that make it so difficult to
fulfill the security guarantees which have constituted American foreign policy. Senator
Mike Mansfield's efforts to reduce the American military presence overseas serve as an
example of this.
Every new military challenge on the part of Moscow has always done the
Americans and West Europeans the favor of providing a justification for keeping US
soldiers in Europe. As has been seen, the elimination of the global military threat has led
to more emphasis on domestic politics in the US. This takes place at the same time that
economic and other domestic concerns force Washington to downplay foreign issues in
order to focus on what American voters feel are issues "closer to home," making it even
more difficult to raise the issue of foreign commitments, much less justify the
deployment of American soldiers overseas. This is another important reason for
America's hesitation toward involvement in the situation in the former Yugoslavia and a
NATO expansion to the East. Nothing could be more fatal for the credibility of
American policy than for the American government to take on new security guarantees
that nobody at home agrees with, because it has never been able to successfully maintain
any foreign policy without popular support, and its allies around the world know this.
The pressure on American domestic policy to reduce American commitments
overseas necessarily increases the already-mentioned expectations and pressures on the
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Federal Republic of Germany to take on foreign policy responsibility beyond Germany's
traditional regional interests. The United States is changing its policy. The junior partner
must once again follow.
It is therefore critical for Germany to successfully conclude its domestic debate on
the deployment of German troops outside of Germany or well-defined NATO borders; it
is critical that Germany fully participate in all of the kinds of military missions which fall
under the leadership ofNATO and/or the UN.
D. THE EUROPEAN DEFENSE IDENTITY
Europe's defense identity, again and again challenged by the other side of the
Atlantic and at the same time eyed with ongoing suspicion, lends new force to the
alliance and the US presence in Europe. The glow of the European security architecture
has dimmed. The mistakes made by the Western governments in the Balkans have not
only shaken the confidence of the European nations, they have also shaken the confidence
of the United States in the reliability of the West European governments. NATO's
European pillar, the WEU, which had been emphasized by the Europeans as the security
component of an integrated and more politically independent Europe, encountered
structural realities of its own.. The establishment of the WEU, which was supposed to
demonstrate consensus, actually presented additional problem issues to be resolved.. The
question is whether security is really served by a proliferation of security institutions that
are all created for the same purpose? Does it make sense to postulate the WEU as the
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security forum of the EU — excluding the North American partners — while still relying
on NATO to execute any military operation? In the long run, the interests of the United
States and Canada cannot be maintained if the Europeans formulate positions without
North American participation and move to act on those positions in the NATO Council.
These nations will doubtless perceive such attempts as a fundamental rejection of the
community spirit ofNATO.
NATO remains the most important forum for consultation as far as the security of
its members is concerned. For this reason, the WEU must be seen to enhance NATO's
strength, rather than being a duplication of structures. Finally, there should be no
competition between NATO and WEU; the development of WEU's operational role has
to be continued in an open and complementary manner.
E. THE FACTOR OF BURDEN-SHARING
Discussion of burden-sharing issues took place in the shadow of the military
superiority of the Soviet Union until 1989. The new dimension of burden-sharing, which
is closely related with the key phrase "out of area," has already been expanded on in the
area of geopolitical perspectives.
In the future, the phrase "burden-sharing" will no longer be seen only in the narrow
sense of military and financial burden-sharing, but must involve the sharing of leadership
and responsibility as well, in order to alleviate pressure on the US. The example of
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Yugoslavia, however, demonstrates that it will be a long time before such levels of
sharing are realized.
The European defense identity and the desired European security structure appeared
as paper tigers in the former Yugoslavia. Despite the European Union, Western Europe is
not yet mature enough for political leadership. This is also an important reason why the
WEU ~ for the present, at least -- cannot take the place ofNATO.
The Europe of the future will rely on the leadership of the sole remaining world
power: the United States of America. Without the leadership of an overseas and
non-partisan power, NATO would lose its ability to act, because the West European
partners' national interests would get in the way. Europe would then lose the only
functioning security system capable of filling the existing power vacuum in East Central
Europe. Given recent events Russia, the absence of the United States and NATO would
again make Europe vulnerable to political developments that might result in a "Second
Cold War." 234
The future of NATO will especially dependent on the future of German-American
relations. The United States needs a dependable European "partner in leadership" who
will play an active role in European unity and at the same time serve as a bridge to
Eastern Europe. Germany is the only country that can do this. Germany needs America
not only because Germany as a non-nuclear power is dependent on US nuclear security
guarantees, but because this partnership offers the best way to alleviate fear about a
reunified Germany, particularly in East Central Europe.
The Wall Street Journal, "The Second Cold War," February 17, 1994.
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